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USING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO EXCUSE
A LIABILITY INSURER’S
DUTY TO DEFEND
Douglas R. Richmond*

ABSTRACT
Most Americans and American businesses purchase liability insurance
to protect against financial loss should they ever be sued. In furnishing this
protection, liability insurers contractually promise policyholders that they
will defend them against lawsuits seeking covered damages and indemnify
them for such damages up to the policy limits. As important as the insurer’s
promise of indemnification is to an insured, the insurer’s agreement to defend the insured in litigation is an equally essential aspect of the liability
insurance bargain. An insurer must decide whether it has a duty to defend
its insured at the outset of a case. There are two approaches to determining
an insurer’s duty to defend. First, there is the eight corners rule, under
which the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint or petition are
compared with the policy, and the insurer owes a defense only if those
allegations potentially implicate the insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured.
Second, there is the extrinsic evidence approach. Courts employing an extrinsic evidence approach hold that an insurer must look beyond the pleadings and consider any facts brought to its attention or any facts that it
reasonably could discover at the time suit was filed in deciding whether it
has a duty to defend. Liability insurance policies typically provide that the
insurer will pay the cost of the insured’s defense in addition to the policy’s
liability limits. This is a potentially significant expense for the insurer because defense costs may, and often do, exceed any settlement or judgment
ultimately paid. Given the expense associated with providing a defense, it is
not surprising that an insurer may want to disclaim its duty to defend based
on extrinsic evidence that establishes that it will have no duty to indemnify
the insured. Of course, an insurer generally cannot decline to defend its
insured if, in making that determination, it is limited to the facts alleged in
the plaintiff’s petition or complaint; after all, even in extrinsic evidence
states, it usually is the allegations in that pleading that triggered the insurer’s duty to defend in the first place.
Thus, insurers frequently test their ability to rely on extrinsic evidence to
disclaim their duty to defend when the plaintiff’s complaint or petition al* Managing Director, Professional Services, Aon Commercial Risk Solutions, Kansas City, Missouri; J.D., University of Kansas. Opinions expressed here are the author’s
alone.
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leges facts that trigger the duty. In other words, if an insurer must, in many
states, consider extrinsic evidence in accepting its duty to defend, can it also
rely on extrinsic evidence to deny or exit a defense? The answer, generally,
is no; the use of extrinsic evidence is rarely a two-way street. As a result,
even an insurance company with a solid factual defense to coverage generally must defend the insured under a reservation of rights and file a separate declaratory judgment action to establish that it will have no duty to
indemnify the insured and can therefore terminate its duty to defend. From
an insurer’s perspective, however, that approach is of limited value unless
the declaratory judgment action can be decided before the tort action
against the insured concludes. In fact, such an outcome is rare. Consequently, an insurer may be forced to bear the cost of defending a lawsuit
alleging uncovered claims or causes of action well after it has discovered
that it will never have to indemnify the insured. Those costs get passed on
to insureds through premiums. Although the general rule holds that an insurer may not rely on extrinsic evidence to refuse to defend an insured,
some courts that adhere to the general rule occasionally recognize exceptions. Plus, there is a contrary minority rule. It is therefore fair to ask
whether an insurer should be allowed to rely on extrinsic evidence to disclaim or extinguish its duty to defend when the plaintiff’s complaint or petition alleges facts that implicate coverage, and, if so, under what
circumstances? This question is timely first because of two 2020 Texas Supreme Court decisions addressing it and offering different answers based
on the facts presented: Richards v. State Farm Lloyds and Loya Insurance
Co. v. Avalos. Second, as Richards and Loya demonstrate, insurers’ use of
extrinsic evidence to excuse their defense obligations is an ongoing litigation strategy. That is not to say that the strategy is good or bad, but it is to
say that the extrinsic evidence issue will continue to surface in key cases in
various jurisdictions. Third, while insurers’ use of extrinsic evidence to defeat the duty to defend is hotly contested by policyholders, courts that have
considered the issue over the years have rarely discussed it in meaningful
fashion in their opinions. The resulting lack of guidance hampers courts
either confronting the issue for the first time or entertaining reconsideration
of prior holdings. This Article provides that guidance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

L

IFE is uncertain; accidents happen, and seemingly innocuous decisions sometimes produce unintended consequences. When someone is injured or killed, or property is damaged or destroyed as a
result, litigation to hold alleged wrongdoers accountable commonly follows. Recognizing these possibilities, most Americans and American
businesses purchase liability insurance to protect against financial loss in
the event they should ever be sued.1 In furnishing this protection, liability
insurers contractually promise policyholders that they will defend them
against lawsuits seeking damages covered by their policies and indemnify
1. See Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, In Defense of the Restatement of Liability Insurance Law, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767, 767 (2017) (“For most non-contractual legal claims
for damages that are brought against individuals or firms, there is some form of liability
insurance coverage.”); Kenneth S. Abraham, Tort Luck and Liability Insurance, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017) (“[R]oughly three-quarters of commercial and organizational defendants’ potential liabilities are covered by liability insurance.”).
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them for such damages up to the applicable policy limits.2 As important
as the insurer’s promise of indemnification is to an insured, the insurer’s
agreement to defend the insured in litigation is an equally essential aspect
of the liability insurance bargain.3
An insurer must decide whether it has a duty to defend its insured at
the outset of a case.4 Unlike an insurer’s duty to indemnify, which requires coverage under the policy in question,5 the duty to defend attaches
where there is merely the potential for coverage.6 In deciding whether
there is the potential for coverage and thus whether an insurer owes a
duty to defend, courts resolve any ambiguities or doubts in favor of the
insured.7 As a result, an insurer may have a duty to defend an insured
even though it ultimately has no duty to indemnify the insured.8 To capsulize matters, an “insurer has a duty to defend any lawsuit alleging
claims against its insured for which, if liability were later established, the
2. See, e.g., Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Commercial General Liability Coverage Form
(CG 00 01 04 13), at 1 (2012) [hereinafter CGL Coverage Form] (“We will pay those sums
that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or
‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.”); Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners 3–Special Form (HO 00 03 05 11), at 17 (2010) [hereinafter Homeowners 3–Special
Form] (“If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an ‘insured’ for damages because of
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ to which this coverage applies, we will: . . . [p]ay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which an ‘insured’ is
legally liable. . . . and . . . [p]rovide a defense . . . even if the suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent.”); ISO Props., Inc., Personal Auto Policy (PP 00 01 01 05), at 2 (2003) [hereinafter Personal Auto Policy] (“We will pay damages for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’
for which any ‘insured’ becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. . . . We
will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these damages.”) (all policies on file with the author).
3. See Campbell v. Super. Ct., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 385, 392–93 (Ct. App. 1996)
(“[I]nsurance is purchased to provide the peace of mind and security that comes from
knowing that if the insured contingency arises, the insurer will defend against the claim.
Stated another way, one of the primary benefits of an insurance policy is that the insured
can expect the insurer to defend against third-party claims.”); Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v.
Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. 2009) (“A defense of third-party
claims provided by the insurer is a valuable benefit granted to the insured by the policy,
separate from the duty to indemnify.”); Woo v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 164 P.3d 454,
459–60 (Wash. 2007) (“The duty to defend is a valuable service paid for by the insured and
one of the principal benefits of the liability insurance policy.”).
4. See Allen v. Bryers, 512 S.W.3d 17, 31 (Mo. 2016) (“The duty to defend arises only
when there is a possibility or potential for coverage at the outset of the case.”).
5. Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 420 (Ct. App.
2018) (quoting Advanced Network, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 17, 23 (Ct.
App. 2010)); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Casson Duncan Constr., Inc., 409 P.3d 619, 621 (Colo.
App. 2016); Robbins v. Mason Cnty. Title Ins. Co., 462 P.3d 430, 435 (Wash. 2020).
6. S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. Mountain Express Oil Co., 828 S.E.2d 455, 458 (Ga. Ct. App.
2019); Core Constr. Servs. of Ill., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 N.E.3d 694, 700 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019); Merrick v. Fischer, Rounds & Assocs., Inc., 939 N.W.2d 795, 807 (Neb. 2020).
7. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Moore, 228 A.3d 258, 265 (Pa. 2020); Webb v. USAA Cas. Ins.
Co., 457 P.3d 1258, 1265–66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020); Choinsky v. Emps. Ins. Co. of Wausau,
938 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Wis. 2020).
8. Lua v. QBE Ins. Corp., 421 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1089–90 (D. Colo. 2019) (applying
Colorado law); U-Haul Co. of Mo. v. Carter, 567 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019)
(quoting Arch Ins. Co. v. Sunset Fin. Servs., Inc., 475 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015)); ZRZ Realty Co. v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 266 P.3d 61, 66 (Or. 2011).
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insurer would be required to indemnify the insured.”9
There are two approaches to determining an insurer’s duty to defend.
First, there is the so-called four-corners or eight-corners rule, also known
as the complaint allegation rule or the exclusive pleading rule.10 Under
what we’ll call the eight-corners rule, the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint or petition are compared with the policy, and the insurer
owes a defense only if those allegations potentially implicate the insurer’s
duty to indemnify the insured.11 As the explanation of the rule indicates,
the “eight corners” describe the four corners of the complaint or petition
combined with the four corners of the insurance policy.12 Under the
eight-corners rule, facts outside the pleadings are not material to the determination of the insurer’s duty to defend.13
The eight-corners rule is simple and easy to apply.14 Courts that favor
the rule further reason that it “serves a salutary purpose” by preventing
courts “from conducting an intensive factual analysis at an early stage of
the proceedings, which would only increase litigation costs and needlessly
tax parties and courts before the underlying suit had barely begun.”15 On
the other hand:
[T]he eight corners rule places the insured at the mercy of the lawyer
drafting the complaint or petition . . . . The drafting lawyer, whether
through ignorance or carelessness, may not allege known facts potentially implicating coverage and thus triggering the insurer’s duty
to defend. An insured should not be denied a valuable defense because of a plaintiff’s cursory, vague, or unartful pleading. In short, a
third-party claimant should not be allowed to determine the insured’s rights under its insurance policy.
[Additionally], the eight corners rule promotes collusion between
insureds and plaintiffs. An insured who fears being undefended can
approach the plaintiff with a copy of her insurance policy and help
the plaintiff craft a complaint or petition . . . that is sure to trigger the
insurer’s duty to defend. Such behavior has untold economic conse9. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE
LAW 694 (6th ed. 2018).
10. See RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2019) (noting
the four-corners, eight-corners, and complaint allegation rule terminology); William T.
Barker, When Can Extrinsic Evidence Defeat the Duty to Defend?, NEW APPLEMAN ON
INS.: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INS. LAW, Apr. 2007, at 1–3 (referring to the exclusive
pleading rule).
11. Banner Bank v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 916 F.3d 1323, 1326–27 (10th Cir. 2019)
(discussing Utah law); Lupu v. Loan City, LLC, 903 F.3d 382, 389–92 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying Pennsylvania law); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Wessel, 477 P.3d 1101, 1105 (Mont. 2020);
Bighorn Logging Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 437 P.3d 287, 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2019).
12. Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 597 S.W.3d 492, 494–95 (Tex. 2020).
13. Chavez v. Ariz. Auto. Ins. Co., 947 F.3d 642, 646 (10th Cir. 2020) (applying Colorado law); Kiely v. Phila. Contributionship Ins. Co., 206 A.3d 1140, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019); Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp. Inc. v. Consol. Ins. Co., 881 N.W.2d 285, 294–97 (Wis.
2016).
14. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 698.
15. CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir.
2009).
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quences for insurers . . . .16
Second, there is the extrinsic evidence approach.17 In comparison to
the eight-corners rule, courts employing the extrinsic evidence approach
hold that an insurer must look beyond the pleadings and consider any
facts brought to its attention or any facts that it reasonably could discover
at the time suit was filed in deciding whether it has a duty to defend.18 For
courts following the extrinsic evidence approach, the allegations in the
plaintiff’s petition or complaint are but the starting point in analyzing the
insurer’s duty to defend.19 The reasoning behind the extrinsic evidence
approach is straightforward: an insurer should not be able to avoid its
duty to defend by ignoring facts relevant to the insured’s potential liability and instead seizing on a pleading that may be inaccurate or falsified.20
The insurer’s exclusive concern when analyzing its duty to defend should
be “whether the judgment that may ultimately be entered against the insured might, either in whole or in part, be encompassed by the policy.”21
Standard liability insurance policies that businesses and individuals typically purchase provide that the insurance company will pay the cost of
the insured’s defense in addition to the policy’s liability limits.22 This is a
valuable benefit to the insured and a potentially significant expense for
the insurer because defense costs may, and frequently do, exceed any set16. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 698–99 (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 699–700.
18. See, e.g., Att’ys Liab. Prot. Soc’y, Inc. v. Ingaldson Fitzgerald, P.C., 370 P.3d 1101,
1111–12 (Alaska 2016) (“[T]he duty to defend attaches, if at all, on the basis of the complaint and known or reasonably ascertainable facts at the time of the complaint.”); Thornburg v. Schweitzer, 240 P.3d 969, 978 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (acknowledging that an “insurer
must look beyond the effect of the pleadings and consider any facts brought to its attention
or any facts which it could reasonably discover in determining whether it has a duty to
defend”); Billings v. Com. Ins. Co., 936 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass. 2010) (“The duty to defend
is determined based on the facts alleged in the complaint, and on facts known or readily
knowable by the insurer that may aid in its interpretation of the allegations in the complaint.”); Allen v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 436 S.W.3d 548, 553 (Mo. 2014) (“[T]he insurer’s duty
to defend arises only from potential coverage based on facts: (1) alleged in the petition; (2)
the insurer knows at the outset of the case; or (3) that are reasonably apparent to the
insurer at the outset of the case.”); Merrick v. Fischer, Rounds & Assocs., Inc., 939 N.W.2d
795, 807 (Neb. 2020) (“An insurer has a duty to defend if (1) the allegations of the complaint, if true, would obligate the insurer to indemnify, or (2) a reasonable investigation of
the facts by the insurer would or does disclose facts that would obligate the insurer to
indemnify.”); Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Immunex Corp., 297 P.3d 688, 691 (Wash. 2013) (“Facts
that are extrinsic to the pleadings, but readily available to the insurer, may give rise to the
duty [to defend].”).
19. See, e.g., McMillin Homes Constr., Inc. v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 247 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 825, 830 (Ct. App. 2019) (“To evaluate whether an insurer owes a duty to defend,
we start by comparing the allegations of the complaint to the terms of the policy. Extrinsic
facts may give rise to a duty to defend where they reveal the possibility of coverage.”
(citation omitted)); Sw. Steel Coil, Inc. v. Redwood Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 148 P.3d 806, 812
(N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (“If the duty to defend does not arise from the complaint on its face,
the duty may arise if the insurer is notified of factual contentions or if the insurer could
have discovered facts, through reasonable investigation, implicating a duty to defend.”).
20. ALLAN D. WINDT, 1 INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 4:3 (6th ed. 2013).
21. Id.
22. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 784 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir.
2015).
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tlement or judgment ultimately paid.23 In light of the potential expense
associated with providing a defense, an insurer that has been asked to
defend an insured may want to disclaim its duty to defend based on extrinsic evidence that establishes that it will ultimately have no duty to
indemnify the insured. Of course, an insurer generally cannot decline to
defend its insured if, in making that determination, it is limited to the
facts alleged in the plaintiff’s petition or complaint; after all, even in extrinsic evidence jurisdictions, it usually is the allegations in that pleading
that trigger the insurer’s duty to defend in the first place.24
Thus, insurers frequently explore or test their ability to rely on extrinsic
evidence to deny or disclaim their duty to defend when the plaintiff’s
complaint or petition alleges facts that trigger the duty. In other words, if
an insurer must, in many jurisdictions, consider extrinsic evidence in accepting its duty to defend, can it also rely on extrinsic evidence to deny or
exit a defense? The answer, generally, is no; the use of extrinsic evidence
is usually not a two-way street.25 As a result, even an insurance company
23. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. RJT Enters., Inc., 692 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1997) (stating
that the cost of a defense may exceed the indemnity amount); Sherwood Brands, Inc. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 698 A.2d 1078, 1083 (Md. 1997) (noting that the cost of
defending the insured often approximates or exceeds the judgment amount).
24. See RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13 cmt. b, reporters’ note b (AM. L.
INST. 2019).
25. See, e.g., Selective Ins. Co. of S.C. v. Target Corp., 845 F.3d 263, 269 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“When an insurer tries to deny coverage without seeking a declaratory judgment or defending under a reservation of rights, our inquiry [under Illinois law] is necessarily limited
to the allegations in the underlying complaint.”); Atl. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Innovative Roofing
Sys., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (“In determining whether an obligation to defend exists [under Florida law], a court may not consider any evidence or testimony outside the four corners of the complaint against the insured.”); ACE Am. Ins. Co. v.
Ascend One Corp., 570 F. Supp. 2d 789, 795 (D. Md. 2008) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Cochran, 651 A.2d 859, 863 (Md. 1995)); Cap. Env’t Servs., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 536 F.
Supp. 2d 633, 642 (E.D. Va. 2008) (interpreting Virginia law); Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1231, 1236 (D.R.I. 1994) (applying Rhode Island law); Devine v.
Great Divide Ins. Co., 350 P.3d 782, 788 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Afcan v. Mut. Fire, Marine
& Inland Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 638, 645 (Alaska 1979)); Kolbek v. Truck Ins. Exch., 431 S.W.3d
900, 907–08 (Ark. 2014) (“Generally, insurers are not allowed to refuse to defend on the
grounds that they are in possession of information establishing that the allegations in the
complaint giving rise to coverage are untrue.”); Cotter Corp. v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines
Ins. Co., 90 P.3d 814, 829 (Colo. 2004) (“[W]e base the determination of an insurer’s duty
to defend on the allegations contained in the underlying complaint when such insurer refuses to defend his insured.”); New London Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sielski, 123 A.3d 925, 936
(Conn. App. Ct. 2015) (“Although there are circumstances where facts beyond those alleged in the underlying complaint and which are known to the insurer can require the
insurer to provide a defense, an insurer cannot rely on extrinsic facts to refuse to provide a
defense.”); Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 850, 852 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997) (rejecting the insurer’s argument that the court should excuse its duty to defend based on extrinsic evidence); Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 117
(Haw. 2000) (adopting the general rule that an insurer may not use extrinsic evidence to
defeat the duty to defend while, at the same time, recognizing a limited exception); Alombro v. Salman, 536 So. 2d 764, 767 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (“The insurer’s duty to defend is
measured by the allegations of the petition even though the insurer may have determined
there was no coverage on the basis of known or ascertainable fact.”); Penney v. Capitol
City Transfer, Inc., 707 A.2d 387, 389 (Me. 1998) (“Even though evidence beyond the
pleadings may later establish the absence of a duty to indemnify, that evidence is not properly considered in determining the duty to defend.”); Century Sur. Co. v. Andrew, 432 P.3d
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with a solid factual defense to coverage generally must defend the insured
under a reservation of rights and file a separate declaratory judgment
action to establish that it will have no duty to indemnify the insured and
can therefore terminate its duty to defend.26 “Only in a declaratory-judgment action filed while the insurer is defending, or in a coverage action
that takes place after the insurer has fulfilled the duty to defend, may the
insurer use facts outside the complaint as the basis for avoiding coverage.”27 From an insurer’s perspective, however, that approach is of limited value unless the declaratory judgment action can be decided before
the tort action against the insured concludes.28 In fact, such an outcome is
rare.29 Even if the insurer may apply to intervene in the tort action to
seek a stay of that litigation until the declaratory judgment action is resolved, the trial court hearing the tort action has the discretion to deny a
stay.30 For that matter, “[j]udges are often reluctant to put the tort action
on hold because they do not want to delay the injured party’s possible
recovery.”31 Consequently, an insurer may be forced to shoulder the expense of defending a lawsuit alleging uncovered claims or causes of action
well after it has discovered that it will never have to indemnify the
insured.
Although the general rule holds that an insurer may not rely on extrinsic evidence to refuse to defend an insured, some courts that adhere to
the general rule occasionally recognize exceptions.32 Plus, there is a con180, 184 n.4 (Nev. 2018) (“[A]s a general rule, facts outside of the complaint cannot justify
an insurer’s refusal to defend its insured.”); W9/PHC Real Est. LP v. Farm Fam. Cas. Ins.
Co., 970 A.2d 382, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (“[A]n insurer must defend if the
complaint states a cause of action covered by the policy even if the insurer knows of extrinsic facts which would put the claim outside of the insurance coverage.”); Found. Rsrv. Ins.
Co. v. Mullenix, 642 P.2d 604, 606 (N.M. 1982) (“[T]he complaint filed in this case alleges
facts within the coverage of the policy, and it is the duty of the insurer to undertake the
defense even though its own investigation has revealed that the claim sued upon is not in
fact covered.”); One Reason Rd., LLC v. Seneca Ins. Co., 83 N.Y.S.3d 235, 238 (App. Div.
2018) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 575 N.E.2d 90, 91–92 (N.Y. 1991));
De Smet Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gulbranson Dev. Co., 779 N.W.2d 148, 155–56 (S.D. 2010)
(“Even when extraneous facts available in depositions and other record evidence outside
the pleadings show the claim as pleaded in the underlying action is false, groundless, or
even fraudulent, the duty to defend cannot be defeated if on the face of the pleadings it
indicates the claim falls within the policy coverage.”); Webb v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 457
P.3d 1258, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020) (“An insurer can consider facts outside of the complaint only to find a duty to defend, not to deny a duty to defend.”).
26. RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13 cmt. c.
27. Id.
28. Barker, supra note 10, at 6.
29. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 709 (“Although, in theory, an insurer
may be entitled to seek a stay of the underlying tort litigation until the declaratory judgment action is resolved, in practice, this is rarely an avenue of relief for insurers.”).
30. Augspurger v. MFA Oil Co., 940 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Lodigensky
v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 898 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
31. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 709.
32. See, e.g., BBG Design Build, LLC v. S. Owners Ins. Co., 820 F. App’x 962, 965–66
(11th Cir. 2020) (applying Florida law and applying an equitable exception to the eightcorners rule which holds that a court may consider undisputed extrinsic facts, which, had
they been alleged in the complaint, clearly would have defeated coverage); Pompa v. Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139, 1147 (10th Cir. 2008) (predicting Colorado law in a case
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trary minority rule.33 It is therefore fair to ask whether an insurer should
be allowed to rely on extrinsic evidence to disclaim or extinguish its duty
to defend when the plaintiff’s complaint or petition alleges facts that implicate coverage and, if so, under what circumstances. This question is
timely. First, two 2020 Texas Supreme Court decisions address this question and offer different answers based on the facts presented: Richards v.
State Farm Lloyds34 and Loya Insurance Co. v. Avalos.35 Second, as Richards and Loya demonstrate, insurers’ use of extrinsic evidence to excuse
their defense obligations, at least in some situations, is an ongoing litigation strategy. That is not to say that the strategy is good or bad, or wise or
imprudent, but it is to say that the extrinsic evidence issue will continue
to surface in key cases in various jurisdictions. Third, while insurers’ use
of extrinsic evidence to defeat the duty to defend is hotly contested by
policyholders, courts that have considered the issue over the years have
rarely discussed it in a meaningful fashion in their opinions.36 The resulting lack of guidance hampers courts either confronting the issue for the
first time or entertaining reconsideration of prior holdings.
Looking ahead, Part II of this Article discusses the Richards and
Avalos decisions and their broader implications for the use of extrinsic
evidence in excusing insurers’ duty to defend. Part II refutes the argument raised by the insurer in Richards that the eight-corners rule should
control an insurer’s duty to defend only where the policy provides that
the insurer will defend the insured even if the third-party’s suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent, thus permitting the use of extrinsic evidence to
excuse an insurer’s duty to defend where its policy omits that language.37
where the insured’s criminal conviction was “an indisputable fact that [was] not an element
of either the cause of action or a defense in the underlying litigation”); Dairy Rd. Partners
v. Island Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 93, 117 (Haw. 2000) (“[An] insurer may only disclaim its duty to
defend by showing that none of the facts upon which it relies [to deny a defense] might be
resolved differently in the underlying lawsuit.”); Polarome Int’l, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co.,
961 A.2d 29, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (permitting the insurers to consider extrinsic evidence where the complaints were ambiguous, and the insurers were unable to
evaluate their potential duties to indemnify the insured and thus their duties to defend).
33. See, e.g., Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 555 So. 2d 77, 77–79 (Ala. 1989) (examining a
stipulation in addition to the plaintiff’s complaint in determining that the insurer owed no
duty to defend); Teufel v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 419 P.3d 546, 549 (Ariz. 2018) (“The
insurer may investigate the matter, however, and refuse to defend based on facts discovered outside the complaint that take the case outside coverage.”); Riddell, Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384, 391 (Ct. App. 2017) (“Extrinsic facts can also negate the duty to
defend, but only if the facts are undisputed and conclusively eliminate the potential for
coverage.”); Gonzalez v. Fire Ins. Exch., 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 409 (Ct. App. 2015) (“Extrinsic facts negating an insurer’s duty to defend must have been known to the insurer at
the time of tender or at the inception of the lawsuit.”); 5200 Keystone Ltd. Realty, LLC v.
Neth. Ins. Co., 29 N.E.3d 156, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“If an insurer is aware of facts
outside the pleadings that clearly disclose an absence of coverage, it can refuse to defend.”); Haarstad v. Graff, 517 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Minn. 1994) (“Because State Farm in this
case had sufficient knowledge of Graff’s intentional acts independent of the allegations in
the complaint, we hold State Farm had no duty to defend in this case.”).
34. 597 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. 2020).
35. 610 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2020).
36. Barker, supra note 10, at 2.
37. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 497–98.
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Part III examines the general principles that have developed around
insurers’ use of extrinsic evidence to excuse their duty to defend. After
sketching those principles or rules, this Part asserts that an insurer should
be allowed to rely on extrinsic evidence that relates solely to the issue of
coverage to excuse its duty to defend, notwithstanding the facts alleged in
the plaintiff’s pleadings. Furthermore, an insurer should be allowed to
use extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty to defend even if the evidence
arguably relates in whole or in part to the merits of the plaintiff’s allegations against the insured where the evidence is incontrovertible. Examples of cases involving this latter category of evidence include those in
which the insured has been convicted of a crime that establishes the intent to cause harm and those in which the insured has been convicted of a
crime that triggers a criminal act, criminal conviction, or illegal act exclusion in the insurance policy at issue.38
II. THE TEXAS CASES AND THEIR BROADER
IMPLICATIONS
The Texas Supreme Court has historically adhered to the eight-corners
rule when determining an insurer’s duty to defend.39 This has been true
regardless of whether the insured or the insurer advocated for the use of
such evidence.40 Before 2020, the court had signaled that perhaps it
would be willing to consider extrinsic evidence that defeated an insurer’s
duty to defend, but it found reasons not to do so in the cases then at
hand.41 Then, in 2020, the court was presented with two extrinsic evidence cases in close order: Richards v. State Farm Lloyds42 and Loya Insurance Co. v. Avalos.43 In Richards, the court rejected the use of
extrinsic evidence to extinguish an insurer’s duty to defend,44 while in
Avalos it held the opposite.45

38. See Secura Supreme Ins. Co. v. M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008).
39. See, e.g., Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 650, 655
(Tex. 2009) (“In deciding the duty to defend, the court should not consider extrinsic evidence from either the insurer or the insured that contradicts the allegations of the underlying petition.”).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 498 (Tex. 2008)
(“Thus, even if we were to recognize this exception to the eight-corners rule [allowing
extrinsic evidence going solely to a fundamental issue of coverage when a pleading is
vague], this case would not fit within its parameters. Accordingly, we decline to do so.”);
GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308–11 (Tex. 2006)
(rejecting a proposed exception to the eight-corners rule because it would conflate the
insurer’s duties to defend and indemnify).
42. 597 S.W.3d 492.
43. 610 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2020).
44. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 500.
45. Avalos, 610 S.W.3d at 884.
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A. THE EFFECT OF “GROUNDLESS, FALSE, OR FRAUDULENT”
LANGUAGE QUALIFYING THE DUTY TO DEFEND
1. The Richards Case
Richards arose out of an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident in which a
little boy, Jayden Meals, was killed.46 At the time of the accident, Jayden
was in the care of his paternal grandparents, Janet and Melvin Richards.47
Jayden’s mother, Amanda Meals, sued her in-laws for her son’s death,
alleging that they negligently failed to supervise and educate him on riding the ATV.48 She alleged that the accident occurred “[o]n or near” the
Richards’s home.49
The Richards were insured under a State Farm Lloyds (State Farm)
homeowner’s policy, which provided that “[i]f a claim [was] made or a
suit [was] brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage” covered by the policy, State Farm would pay up
to its policy limit in indemnity and “provide a defense at [its] expense by
counsel of [its] choice.”50 State Farm agreed to defend the Richards
under a reservation of rights.51 State Farm then filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Richards in connection with their daughter-in-law’s suit.52
State Farm moved for summary judgment on the basis that the “motorvehicle exclusion” and the “insured exclusion” in its policy precluded coverage.53 Under the State Farm policy, “[a]n ATV used ‘while off an insured location’ [was] a ‘motor vehicle’” within the meaning of the motorvehicle exclusion.54 State Farm contended that the exclusion applied because, at the time of the accident, Jayden was riding the ATV on a public
46. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 495.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (alteration in original).
50. Id.
51. Id. To explain, an insurer that defends under a reservation of rights agrees to defend the insured while preserving its ability to later dispute coverage. See Hoover v.
Maxum Indem. Co., 730 S.E.2d 413, 416 (Ga. 2012) (“A reservation of rights is . . . designed to allow an insurer to provide a defense to its insured while still preserving the
option of litigating and ultimately denying coverage.”); Becker v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co.,
429 P.3d 212, 217 (Kan. 2018) (“Under Kansas law, the reservation of rights rule allows an
insurer to assume a defense of an insured without waiving noncoverage defenses by issuing
a timely notice to that person, reserving the right to question coverage and assert policy
defenses.”); Mastellone v. Lightning Rod Mut. Ins. Co., 884 N.E.2d 1130, 1139–40 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2008) (“By definition, a reservation of rights means that the insurer does not
believe that coverage is available under the policy, but that it is proceeding to defend a
claim in order to control the defense.”); Harleysville Grp. Ins. v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 803
S.E.2d 288, 297 (S.C. 2017) (“A reservation of rights is a way for an insurer to avoid
breaching its duty to defend and seek to suspend operation of the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel prior to a determination of the insured’s liability.”). An insurer that defends
under a reservation of rights must defend the insured just as competently and diligently as
it would have otherwise.
52. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 495.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting the State Farm policy).
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trail rather than on his grandparents’ property.55 To prove where the accident occurred, State Farm submitted a copy of the responding police department’s vehicle crash report, which gave the accident’s location.56
The insured exclusion precluded coverage for insureds’ bodily injuries
and “define[d] ‘insured’ to include ‘you and, if residents of your household . . . your relatives; and . . . any other person under the age of 21 who
is in the care of a person described above.’”57 According to State Farm,
“Jayden was an ‘insured’ because the grandparents were his joint managing conservators. As proof, State Farm submitted a court order from a
suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR).”58
The Richards countered that under the eight-corners rule, the district
court could not consider the crash report or the SAPCR order in deciding
whether State Farm owed them a defense.59 The district court disagreed.60 The district court explained that the State Farm policy issued to
the Richards did not require State Farm “to defend ‘all actions against its
insured no matter if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or
fraudulent.’”61 Rather, State Farm’s duty to defend arose “only if suit
[was] brought to which the coverage applie[d].”62 As a result, the eightcorners rule did not control the analysis and the court could consider extrinsic evidence in evaluating State Farm’s duty to defend.63 The district
court had previously articulated this position in B. Hall Contracting Inc.
v. Evanston Insurance Co.64
Based on the extrinsic evidence that State Farm submitted, the district
court determined that State Farm had no duty to defend or indemnify the
Richards.65 The court therefore granted State Farm’s summary judgment
motion.66 The Richards appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which certified the
following question to the Texas Supreme Court: “Is the policy-language
exception to the eight-corners rule articulated in B. Hall Contracting . . . a
permissible exception under Texas law?”67
In answering the certified question, the Richards court began by noting
that parties to an insurance contract could replace default rules of construction—such as the eight-corners rule—with agreed rules of construc55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 496.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, No. No. 4:17-CV-753-A, 2018 WL
2225084, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2018)).
62. Richards, 2018 WL 2225084, at *3.
63. Id.
64. 447 F. Supp. 2d 634, 645 (N.D. Tex. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 273 F. App’x
310 (5th Cir. 2008).
65. Richards, 2018 WL 2225084, at *3–4.
66. Id. at *4.
67. Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 597 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Tex. 2020) (quoting State
Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 784 F. App’x 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2019)).
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tion.68 “Thus, if an insurance policy contained language inconsistent with
the eight-corners rule, the policy language would control.”69 The question
here, however, was not whether the parties had affirmatively contracted
around the eight-corners rule as they might have, but whether they had
effectively done so “by declining to expressly agree that State Farm must
defend claims ‘even if groundless, false or fraudulent.”70
State Farm took the position that courts created the eight-corners rule
to enforce groundless-claims clauses, which were once routine in liability
insurance policies.71 By extension, then, the eight-corners rule should
govern insurers’ duty to defend only with respect to insurance policies
containing the same or similar language, which is less common in newer
policies.72 State Farm argued that “[b]ecause the circumstances giving rise
to the eight-corners rule (the language commonly used in insurance policies) have changed, . . . the eight-corners rule itself must change, no matter how deeply embedded in the law it has become.”73 The Richards, on
the other hand, argued that Texas courts’ application of the eight-corners
rule had never pivoted on the existence of a groundless-claims clause.74
In support of this argument, they cited Texas Court of Appeals cases
where the court applied the eight-corners rule despite the lack of groundless-claims clauses in the policies at issue.75 “Because the presence or absence of a groundless-claims clause ha[d] rarely, if ever, been important
to Texas courts’ analysis of the contractual duty to defend, and because
Texas courts routinely appl[ied] the eight-corners rule without looking for
a groundless-claims clause,” the Richards argued that the court was compelled to hold “that the federal district court’s ‘policy-language exception’” to the eight-corners rule misconstrued Texas law.76
The Texas Supreme Court sided with the Richards, stating that “State
Farm did not contract away the eight-corners rule altogether merely by
omitting from its policy an express agreement to defend claims that are
‘groundless, false or fraudulent.’”77 The Richards court explained that it
had adopted the eight-corners rule in 1956 and had applied it faithfully
68. Id. at 497. Whether the Texas Supreme Court’s view of the eight-corners rule as a
matter of contract construction or interpretation is correct is unclear, although at least one
other court has suggested a similar approach. Loftin v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 127 S.E.2d 53, 58
(Ga. Ct. App. 1962). In contrast, Section 13 of the Restatement of the Law of Liability
Insurance treats the eight-corners rule as a substantive rule of law. See RESTATEMENT OF
THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2019). As a practical matter, standard
insurance policies do not provide how the insurer’s duty to defend will be determined.
69. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 497.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 497–98.
72. Id. at 498.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (first citing Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 292 S.W.3d
48, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th. Dist.] 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds,
279 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009); then citing King v. Dall. Fire Ins. Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 85 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2002)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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ever since.78 In repeatedly affirming the rule, the court had never rested
its application on the presence of groundless-claims language in the subject policy.79 The Texas Court of Appeals had taken the same approach.80
Given Texas courts’ rigid adherence to the eight-corners rule, the Richards court reasoned, insurance companies had to know that courts applying Texas law would apply the rule, and it was therefore safe to presume
that they drafted their policies with the eight-corners rule in mind.81
Here:
State Farm agreed to defend the policyholders if “a claim is made or
a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily
injury . . . to which this coverage applies.” To determine whether
such a “claim” has been “made” or a “suit” has been “brought,”
courts naturally look first to the claims made, to the suit brought. If
the claim is “for damages because of bodily injury . . . to which coverage applies,” the duty to defend is implicated. The eight-corners rule
merely acknowledges that, under many common duty-to-defend
clauses, only the petition and the policy are relevant to the initial
inquiry into whether the petition’s claim fits within the policy’s coverage. This is how Texas courts have long interpreted contractual duties to defend. If any party is familiar with the overwhelming
precedent to that effect, it is a large insurance company. State Farm
makes good-faith arguments for its position, but it is well aware of
the courts’ longstanding interpretive approach to contractual duties
to defend, and it knows how to contract around that approach. It did
not do so merely by omitting the words “groundless, false or fraudulent,” . . . from this policy.82
The Richards court acknowledged that it is common for a complaint or
petition to plead a claim that could trigger the duty to defend but omit
facts necessary for the insurer to evaluate its duty to indemnify the insured.83 In such cases, some courts applying Texas law have considered
“extrinsic evidence on coverage issues that do not overlap with the merits
to determine whether” the plaintiff is seeking covered damages.84 But
78. Id. (quoting Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 24
(Tex. 1965)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 499.
81. Id. This statement is consistent with the court’s earlier statement that the eightcorners rule is a default rule of contract construction or interpretation rather than a substantive rule of law. Id. at 497.
82. Id. at 500 (first and second alteration in original).
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 784 F. App’x 247, 250–51 (5th Cir. 2019);
then citing Ooida Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 579 F.3d 469, 476 (5th Cir. 2009);
and then citing Tex. Pol. Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins. Fund v. Pharr-San JuanAlamo ISD, No. 13-17-00655-CV, 2019 WL 4678433, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Sept. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see also Northfield Ins. Co. v. Loving Home Care, Inc., 363 F.3d 523, 531 (5th Cir. 2004) (predicting that the only circumstance in which the Texas Supreme Court might deviate from the eight-corners rule would
be “when it is initially impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially implicated and
when the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a fundamental issue of coverage which does not
overlap with the merits of or engage the truth or falsity of any facts alleged in the underly-
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because the Fifth Circuit had not asked about that practice, the Richards
court did not opine on it.85 The court also declined to consider “whether
[different] policy language or other factual scenarios [might] justify the
use of extrinsic evidence to determine” an insurer’s duty to defend on the
theory that the possible scenarios out of which arguments for weighing
such evidence could arise exceeded imagination.86 At bottom, the court
held “only that the ‘policy-language exception’ to the eight-corners rule”
framed in B. Hall Contracting and enforced against the Richards, which
links the eight-corners rule solely to liability insurance policies that contain a groundless-claims clause, was “not a permissible exception under
Texas law.”87
Once back in the Fifth Circuit, State Farm, now without its preferred
eight-corners rule argument, contended that the court should nonetheless
permit the use of extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty to defend under a
“‘very narrow’ exception” to the eight-corners rule that the court had
previously recognized.88 That exception allows the use of extrinsic evidence “where it is initially impossible to discern whether coverage is potentially implicated and when the extrinsic evidence goes solely to a
fundamental issue of coverage which does not overlap with the merits of
or engage the truth or falsity of any facts alleged in the underlying
case.”89 The court, however, reasoned that this exception did not apply
insofar as the motor-vehicle exclusion was concerned:
In Meals’s third-amended complaint, she alleges “Jayden was
killed because” “[the Richards] allowed Jayden to operate the ATV
on their property.” Meals’s allegations of negligence focus on acts or
omissions on the Richards’ property. For example, Meals alleges the
Richards were negligent for “[f]ailing to directly supervise a person
younger than 14 years of age operating an ATV on the Richards’
property in violation of Texas Transportation Code § 663.032”;
“[f]ailing to monitor Jayden on the Richards’ property as a person
using ordinary care would have done in the same or similar circumstances”; allowing Jayden to operate the ATV on the Richards’ property without a helmet, other protective gear, seatbelt, proper
instruction, or a certified training course; “[f]ailing to inspect the
ATV before allowing Jayden to operate the vehicle on the Richards’
property to ensure that it was safe”; and “[a]llowing Jayden to opering case”); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 497–98 (Tex. 2008) (hinting
that the court might someday adopt the Northfield test, but declining to do so based on the
facts); GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex.
2006) (“Although this Court has never expressly recognized an exception to the eightcorners rule, other courts have. Generally, these courts have drawn a very narrow exception, permitting the use of extrinsic evidence only when relevant to an independent and
discrete coverage issue, not touching on the merits of the underlying third-party claim.”).
85. Richards, 597 S.W.3d at 500.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 966 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Missionary Church of Disciples of Jesus Christ, 687 F.3d
676, 686 (5th Cir. 2012)).
89. Id. (quoting Ooida, 579 F.3d at 475).
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ate the ATV on the Richards’ property without the skills, abilities, or
judgment needed to operate the ATV safely.”
Considering these allegations, the extrinsic evidence State Farm
seeks to admit problematically “overlap[s] with the merits of or engage[s] the truth or falsity of [ ] facts alleged in the underlying case.”
By arguing that only the location of the “accident” . . . matters, State
Farm is challenging Meals’s claim that “Jayden was killed because of
Janet Richards allowing him to operate the ATV on their property.”
In other words, the extrinsic evidence State Farm urges the court to
consider is simply too entwined in the merits for the “very narrow
exception” to apply. This type of “overlapping evidence” “poses a
significant risk of undermining the insured’s ability to defend itself in
the underlying litigation.”90
State Farm also argued that it should be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence implicating the insured exclusion in its policy, but the Fifth
Circuit panel concluded that the very narrow exception State Farm hoped
to invoke did not apply here either.91 Again, the extrinsic evidence State
Farm wanted to admit called into question the truth or falsity of the facts
alleged by the plaintiff:
Specifically, State Farm seeks to introduce the Richards’ admission
that they were Jayden’s grandparents, as well as a court order appointing them as joint-managing conservators to show that Jayden
was a “resident of [the Richards’] household.” . . .
Here, the policy lists the Richards as the named insureds. And,
under the policy, all other subcategories of “insureds” must be “residents of” the Richards’ household. Meals’s third-amended complaint does not contain any allegations suggesting Jayden was a
“resident” of the Richards’ household. Rather, the complaint states
that “Jayden resided with his Mother and [maternal] Grandmother,
Sharon Culver, at 727 Jones Road, Weatherford, Parker County,
Texas, where he had resided for years.” So considering the extrinsic
evidence to determine whether Jayden was a “resident of [the Richards’] household,” would impermissibly “engage the truth or falsity
of [ ] facts alleged in the underlying case.”92
In short, the eight-corners rule controlled the analysis, and the plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts that potentially implicated State Farm’s duty
to indemnify the Richards.93 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision holding that State Farm had no duty to defend its
insureds.94
90. Id. at 395–96 (first through eighth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first
quoting Ooida, 579 F.3d at 475; then quoting GuideOne Specialty, 687 F.3d at 686; and then
quoting GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex.
2006)).
91. Id. at 396.
92. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ooida, 579 F.3d at 476).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 397.
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2. Analyzing Groundless-Claims Clauses More Broadly
Returning now to the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion, State Farm’s argument—that the eight-corners rule should control an insurer’s duty to
defend only where the policy provides that the insurer will defend the
insured even if a third-party’s lawsuit “is groundless, false or fraudulent”
—warrants analysis.95 In fact, the argument merits rejection because it
misapprehends the language of a policy’s insuring agreement and risks
blending or confusing insurers’ duties to defend and indemnify.
The phrase “groundless, false, or fraudulent” in a liability insurance
policy’s insuring agreement or other provision promising a defense “refers to the quality of the factual and legal allegations against the insured
on which the insured’s liability to the plaintiff is said to rest.”96 In other
words, an insurance company must defend an insured in a lawsuit in
which the plaintiff’s claims are wholly without merit or are asserted for
some improper purpose provided that the plaintiff’s complaint or petition
alleges facts that, if proven, would obligate the insurer to indemnify the
insured.97 Insurers originally included “groundless, false, or fraudulent”
language in their policies to clarify for insureds the breadth of the duty to
defend and, as part and parcel of that effort, to highlight the difference
between the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify.98 Of course, the
95. Like the Texas Supreme Court in Richards, this Article will generally describe insurance policy language stating that the insurer will defend the insured even if the thirdparty’s lawsuit is a groundless, false, or fraudulent as a groundless-claims clause. See Richards v. State Farm Lloyds, 597 S.W.3d 492, 497–98, 500 (Tex. 2020) (referring to groundless-claims clauses).
96. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 691–92 n.63.
97. Id. at 694.
98. See generally Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Capitol Home Improvement Co.,
205 A.2d 192, 195 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964) (“The obligation of the [insurer] to defend does
not depend on whether the injured party will successfully maintain a cause of action. The
policy requires the [insurer] to defend irrespective of the ultimate outcome.”); Brodek v.
Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 11 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937) (“What is meant by the
requirement that the insurer undertakes to defend the suit whether ‘groundless, false or
fraudulent’? If a plaintiff alleges in his pleadings that he is entitled to recover upon a
ground of liability covered by the policy, then of course the defendant’s insurance carrier
must defend the suit; it cannot avoid that duty by determining upon its own investigation
that the ground of liability alleged cannot be substantiated.”); Danek v. Hommer, 100 A.2d
198, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953) (“[T]he duty [to defend] is not abrogated by the
fact that the cause of action stated cannot be maintained against the insured either in law
or in fact-in other words, because the cause is groundless, false or fraudulent. Liability of
the insured to the plaintiff is not the criterion; it is the allegation in the complaint of a
cause of action which, if sustained, will impose a liability covered by the policy.”); Zeitz v.
Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 67 A.2d 742, 746 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949) (discussing
the breadth of the insurer’s duty to defend under a policy with a groundless-claims clause);
Prashker v. U.S. Guarantee Co., 144 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (describing the
phrase “groundless, false or fraudulent” as a “clear and explicit” expression of the insurer’s
broad duty to defend); see also Craig F. Stanovich, The Duty to Defend—Groundless,
False, or Fraudulent, IRMI (Dec. 2014), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert-commentary/
the-duty-to-defend-groundless-false-or-fraudulent [https://perma.cc/VWN6-JH3J] (discussing the 1973 standard CGL policy form, which included “groundless, false or fraudulent”
language, and explaining how that language clarified the breadth of the insurer’s duty to
defend and prevented insurers from unilaterally and improperly tying it to their duty to
indemnify).
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broad duty to defend that insurers once signaled by inserting groundlessclaims clauses in their policies is the same duty that an insurer has under
a policy that simply obligates it to defend any suit seeking the specified
covered damages.99
Compare, for example, the language of a former version of the commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy with the current version.
The former version of the CGL policy provided in pertinent part:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
Coverage A bodily injury or
Coverage B property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and the
company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the
insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless,
false, or fraudulent. . . .100
The current version of the CGL policy states:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to
which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However,
we will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking
damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not apply.101
Under the former version of the CGL policy, the insurer promised to
“defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of bodily injury or property damage” to which the policy applied.102 Under the
current version of the CGL policy, the insurer must “defend the insured
against any suit seeking” “damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
damage’ to which [its] policy applies.”103 The promise to defend any suit
seeking covered damages as used in the current CGL policy is the same
promise made in the former version of the CGL policy and necessarily
includes groundless, false, or fraudulent suits; the “groundless, false, or
fraudulent” language in the former version of the CGL policy was redun99. See Hanover Ins. Co. v. Anova Food, LLC, 173 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1020 (D. Haw.
2016) (“The insurer’s duty to defend exists even if the facts alleged are untrue or the legal
theories unsound.”); Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vibram USA, Inc., 106 N.E.3d 572, 576
(Mass. 2018) (stating that an insurer may have a duty to defend “notwithstanding the possibility that the underlying claim may ultimately fail, or that the merits of the claim are weak
or frivolous”).
100. Willets Point Contracting Corp. v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231 (App.
Div. 1980) (emphasis added) (quoting the Hartford CGL policy at issue); see Brief for
Cooper & Scully, P.C. as Amicus Curiae at 6–7, State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, 597 S.W.3d
492 (Tex. 2020) (No. 19-0802), 2020 WL 264723 (referring to the “pre-1986 version” of the
standard CGL policy when quoting the identical language and citing the 1973 version of
the standard CGL policy form).
101. CGL Coverage Form, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
102. Willets Point, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 231 (emphasis added).
103. CGL Coverage Form, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
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dant.104 Indeed, when it revised the CGL policy form in 1986, the Insurance Services Office (ISO) deleted the “groundless, false or fraudulent”
language for that reason.105 Where such language appears in other liability insurance policies still in circulation, it is equally redundant.106 Awkwardly, some courts continue to use the phrase in their discussion of
insurers’ duty to defend to highlight the breadth of the duty regardless of
whether the policies they are referring to include that language.107
At least one court has reasoned that “[t]he purpose of [a] provision in
[a] policy providing for a defense even if the suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent, is to guarantee that the purchaser of a policy of liability insurance will be protected from all expense.”108 Accepting that position as
true, the “groundless, false, or fraudulent” language remains redundant.
This is because standard liability insurance policies with no groundlessclaims clause promise that the insurer will pay the cost of the insured’s
defense in addition to the policy limits.109
Furthermore, to hold that an insurance policy that obligates the insurer
to defend any suit seeking covered damages warrants a different standard
for determining the duty to defend as compared to a policy that illuminates the breadth of the insurer’s duty to defend by incorporating
groundless, false, or fraudulent suits risks blending or confusing the insurer’s duties to defend and indemnify. Remember the contrast between
the two duties: an insurer’s duty to defend arises at the outset of the litigation and attaches where there is merely the potential for coverage.110
An insurer’s duty to indemnify, on the other hand, does not come into
104. Jerry Trupin, Something You’ll Want to Tell Your Insureds; One New Development;
and Two Points I’ve Overlooked, INS. ADVOC. (Mar. 31, 2011), https://www.insurance-advocate.com/2011/03/31/something-youll-want-to-tell-your-insureds-one-new-developmentand-two-points-ive-overlooked/ [https://perma.cc/8F5E-KY3T] (explaining that “groundless, false or fraudulent” language was used in policies for years, but that in 1986, when
ISO began simplifying standard policy language, the phrase was dropped from the CGL
insuring agreement as redundant because “[t]he consensus was that the policy covered
such claims even in the absence of [those] specific words” based on the promise to defend
any suit seeking covered damages).
105. Id.
106. See Homeowners 3–Special Form, supra note 2, at 17 (“If a . . . suit is brought
against an ‘insured’ for damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ caused by
an ‘occurrence’ to which this coverage applies, we will: . . . [p]ay up to our limit of liability
for the damages for which an ‘insured’ is legally liable . . . . and . . . [p]rovide a defense . . .
even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent . . . .” (emphasis added)). A suit necessarily encompasses a groundless, false, or fraudulent suit.
107. See, e.g., Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Midwest Sporting Goods Co., 828
N.E.2d 1092, 1098 (Ill. 2005) (“If the underlying complaint alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent.”).
108. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 20, 27 (D. Kan. 1962).
109. Douglas R. Richmond, The Subtly Important Supplementary Payments Provision
in Liability Insurance Policies, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 763, 764 (2017); see, e.g., CGL Coverage Form, supra note 2, at 8 (“We will pay, with respect to . . . any ‘suit’ against an insured
we defend . . . [a]ll expenses we incur.”); Personal Auto Policy, supra note 2, at 2 (“In
addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur.”).
110. S. Tr. Ins. Co. v. Mountain Express Oil Co., 828 S.E.2d 455, 458 (Ga. Ct. App.
2019); Core Constr. Servs. of Ill., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 126 N.E.3d 694, 700 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019); Merrick v. Fischer, Rounds & Assocs., Inc., 939 N.W.2d 795, 807 (Neb. 2020).
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play until the insured’s liability is established in the third-party action.111
Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify requires actual coverage
under the policy in question.112
By allowing an insurer to rely on extrinsic evidence to avoid its duty to
defend where the complaint or petition alleges facts that suggest the potential for coverage but the policy does not include a groundless-claims
clause, a court risks making the insurer’s provision of a defense dependent on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.113 As a matter of fact, what
the court in such a case is effectively saying is that an insurer must defend
factually or legally baseless claims against its insured where its policy includes a groundless-claims clause, but an insurer does not have a similar
defense obligation where its policy lacks such a clause. In other words,
the merits of the plaintiff’s claims matter to the duty to defend unless the
insurer disclaims their importance. No court recognizes that approach;
courts uniformly regard the merits of the underlying lawsuit as irrelevant
to the insurer’s duty to defend.114 Indeed, the invalidity of the plaintiff’s
allegations against the insured does not change the fact that the insured
has been sued based on those allegations and is entitled to have the insurer prove that they are meritless in the defense of the third-party
action.115
What such a court is further saying is that the duty to defend depends
on actual coverage under a policy without a groundless-claims clause
rather than just the potential for coverage. After all, a court, such as the
federal district court in Richards, is willing to allow an insurer to use extrinsic evidence to defeat coverage where the policy omits the magic lan-

111. First Mercury Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Sec. Servs., Inc., 54 N.E.3d 323, 330 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2016); Forsman v. Blues, Brews & Bar-B-Ques, Inc., 903 N.W.2d 524, 536 (N.D. 2017);
Bighorn Logging Corp. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 437 P.3d 287, 293 (Or. Ct. App. 2019); Allstate
Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wootton, 494 S.W.3d 825, 830–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, pet. denied).
112. Thee Sombrero, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 420 (Ct. App.
2018) (quoting Advanced Network, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 17, 23 (Ct.
App. 2010)); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Casson Duncan Constr., Inc., 409 P.3d 619, 621 (Colo.
App. 2016); Robbins v. Mason Cnty. Title Ins. Co., 462 P.3d 430, 435 (Wash. 2020).
113. Of course, “[t]he original purpose of the eight-corners rule was to preclude an
insurance company from refusing to defend an insured based on the lack of merit of the
plaintiff’s case.” Tri-Coastal Contractors, Inc. v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 981
S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). That purpose remains
valid today. See id. (“Because a liability policy is a contract under which an insurance
company agrees to assume both the defense of the suit and the liability if the insured was
found responsible, the eight corners rule prevents the insurance company from refusing to
defend based on the merits of the suit.”).
114. See, e.g., Watkins v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.3d 848, 855 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2009) (“Clearly, the duty to defend is triggered by the nature of the claims stated by
the parties in their pleadings and not by an assessment of which party will or ultimately did
prevail.”); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Royal Crane, LLC, 169 So. 3d 174, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2015) (“The merits of the underlying suit are irrelevant.”); Air Eng’g, Inc. v. Indus.
Air Power, LLC, 828 N.W.2d 565, 569–70 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he duty to defend is
based on the facts alleged, not on the merits of the claim.”).
115. WINDT, supra note 20, § 4:4.
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guage, but not to do so where the policy includes it.116 As an Illinois court
once summarized matters, however, an insurer’s duty to defend is not
annulled by its knowledge that “the allegations [against the insured] are
untrue or incorrect, or that the true facts will ultimately exclude
coverage.”117
Where the merits of the plaintiff’s claims against the insured and actual
coverage under the policy matter, of course, is where the insurer’s duty to
indemnify the insured is in question. So, to make the merits of the underlying suit or actual coverage of the claims asserted relevant to the duty to
defend is either to impermissibly blend the duty to defend and the duty to
indemnify, or to confuse them. Settled insurance law does not accommodate that result.118
Interestingly, the Ohio Supreme Court at one point embraced the position that State Farm advocated in Richards. In Preferred Risk Insurance
Co. v. Gill,119 the court was asked to determine whether Preferred Risk
had a duty to defend its insured, Bradford Gill, who had murdered a little
girl, Kerri Hintermeister.120 Gill pled guilty to the murder, was convicted
of the crime, and sentenced to life in prison.121 Kerri’s parents sued Gill
for her wrongful death on a negligence theory, and Preferred Risk filed a
declaratory judgment action to escape its duties to defend and indemnify
Gill based on the intentional acts exclusion in its policy.122
In holding for Preferred Risk, the court saw no reason to require the
insurer to defend or indemnify Gill simply because the Hintermeisters’
complaint alleged conduct ostensibly within coverage.123 Gill’s conviction
for murder clearly took the underlying wrongful death case outside of
coverage.124 As the court later explained:
Where the insurer represents to its insured that it will undertake the
defense of any claim asserting injury within coverage, even where the
claim is false or fraudulent, the duty to defend may arise solely from
the allegations of the underlying complaint, regardless of the true
facts as they are known to the insurer. However, since the appellee
116. State Farm Lloyds v. Richards, No. 4:17-CV-753-A, 2018 WL 2225084, at *2–4
(N.D. Tex. May 15, 2018).
117. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dahms, 58 N.E.3d 118, 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
118. See, e.g., Advanced Sys., Inc. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 272 So. 3d 523, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2019) (“[A]n insurer’s duty to defend is separate and distinct from its duty to indemnify, and it is more extensive.”); Irving Oil Ltd. v. ACE INA Ins. Co., 91 A.3d 594, 599
(Me. 2014) (“[T]he duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are separate issues that are
analyzed under entirely different methodologies.”); Arch Ins. Co. v. Sunset Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 475 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“An insurer’s duty to defend and duty to
indemnify are separate and distinct.”); Tibert v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 816 N.W.2d 31, 42
(N.D. 2012) (“The duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are separate and distinct
contractual elements.”); N. Star Mut. Ins. v. Korzan, 873 N.W.2d 57, 61 (S.D. 2015) (“An
insurer’s duty to defend and its duty to indemnify are separate and independent duties.”).
119. 507 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio 1987).
120. Id. at 1119.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1119–20.
123. Id. at 1123.
124. Id.
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herein has promised only to defend claims for bodily injury or property damage “to which this coverage applies,” the true facts are determinative of the duty to defend. Where the true facts are such that
the insured’s conduct was outside the coverage of the policy, the
claim is not one “to which this coverage applies,” and the insurer has
no obligation to defend the insured.
We hold, therefore, where the insurer does not agree to defend
groundless, false or fraudulent claims, an insurer’s duty to defend
does not depend solely on the allegations of the underlying tort
complaint.125
The Ohio Supreme Court’s stance in Gill is unsupportable for the reasons outlined above in connection with Richards.126 Indeed, the court
subsequently retreated from its position in Gill in Cincinnati Insurance
Co. v. Colelli & Associates, Inc.,127 where it limited the holding in Gill to
the facts of that case.128 Ohio courts have since applied the eight-corners
rule regardless of whether the policy at issue included a groundless-claims
clause,129 as have federal courts applying Ohio law,130 although references to that language have lingered in courts’ descriptions of insurers’
duty to defend.131 Again, when describing the scope of the duty to defend, “groundless, false or fraudulent” phrasing is redundant.132
B. COLLUSION

JUSTIFYING THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
DEFEAT THE DUTY TO DEFEND

AS

TO

1. Along Comes Avalos
Richards was not the final word on extrinsic evidence in Texas in 2020.
Soon after deciding Richards, the Texas Supreme Court decided Loya
Insurance Co. v. Avalos.133 In that case, Loya Insurance Company (Loya)
125. Id. at 1124.
126. The Gill court’s denial of coverage is supportable, however, based on the argument that an insurer should be able to use extrinsic evidence to refuse a defense even if the
evidence arguably relates to the merits of the allegations against the insured where the
evidence is incontrovertible. Examples include cases where (1) the insured has been convicted of a crime that establishes the intent to harm the plaintiff or the victim; or (2) the
insured’s conviction of a crime triggers a criminal act, criminal conviction, or illegal act
exclusion in the subject insurance policy. See infra Part III.
127. 767 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 2002).
128. Id. at 717.
129. See, e.g., GNFH, Inc. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 873 N.E.2d 345, 351 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007)
(“In light of the holding in Colelli, coverage in the present case will depend on the allegations in the complaint.”).
130. See, e.g., Younglove Constr., LLC v. PSD Dev., LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 847, 851 n.3
(N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that the Colelli clarified that the eight-corners rule applies to all
liability insurance policies), vacated on other grounds, 767 F. Supp. 2d 820 (N.D. Ohio
2011).
131. See, e.g., Sharonville v. Am. Emps. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Ohio 2006) (“An
insurer has an absolute duty to defend an action when the complaint contains an allegation
in any one of its claims that could arguably be covered by the insurance policy, even in part
and even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent.”).
132. See supra notes 96–109 and accompanying text.
133. 610 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2020).
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insured Karla Flores Guevara under an automobile liability policy.134 The
Loya policy expressly excluded coverage for Guevara’s husband, Rodolfo
Flores.135 Unfortunately, Flores drove Guevara’s car anyway, and he got
into a wreck with a car occupied by Osbaldo Hurtado Avalos and
Antonio Hurtado (the Hurtados).136 Flores, Guevara, and the Hurtados
huddled and agreed to tell the police and Loya that Guevara was driving
her car at the time of the accident—not Flores.137
The Hurtados sued Guevara in connection with the accident.138 Loya
accepted Guevara’s defense and appointed counsel to represent her.139
Then, before her deposition, Guevara told her defense lawyer about the
parties’ scheme and confessed that Flores had been driving her car.140 In
response to this revelation, Guevara’s lawyer canceled her deposition,
and Loya withdrew its defense and denied coverage.141 The Hurtados
subsequently moved for summary judgment against Guevara and won
slightly more than $450,000.142
Guevara assigned her rights against Loya to the Hurtados, who then
sued Loya on various theories for denying Guevara a defense and indemnity.143 Loya counterclaimed for breach of contract and fraud, and further sought “a declaratory judgment that it owed no coverage and had no
duty to defend because Flores, an excluded driver, was driving at the time
of the accident.”144 Loya deposed Guevara, who testified that Flores was
the culpable driver.145 Loya then moved for summary judgment because
it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara, and attached excerpts
from Guevara’s deposition transcripts to support its motion.146
The trial court sustained Loya’s motion, commenting “at the hearing
on the motion that the Hurtados were ‘asking [it] to ignore every rule of
justice and help [them] perpetuate a fraud.’”147 The Hurtados appealed
to the Texas Court of Appeals, where they argued that the trial court
erroneously granted summary judgment to Loya because, applying the
eight-corners rule, Loya “had a duty to defend . . . based on the terms of
the insurance policy and the face of the pleadings . . . , which alleged
Guevara was driving at the time of the accident.”148 The appellate court
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting the trial court).
Id.

142

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

accepted the Hurtados’ argument and reversed the trial court.149 Loya
successfully petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for review of the Court
of Appeals’ decision.150
The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that while it had steadfastly
enforced the eight-corners rule over the years, it had also left open the
possibility that it might someday permit the use of extrinsic evidence to
extinguish an insurer’s duty to defend in an appropriate case.151 Pointedly, the court had “noted twice before that collusive fraud by the insured
might provide the basis for an exception” to the eight-corners rule.152 The
court had most recently expressed this view in a 2009 decision, Pine Oak
Builders, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance Co.,153 where the court
suggested without deciding that “an exception to the eight-corners rule
might exist where the parties to the underlying suit collude to make false
allegations that would invoke the insurer’s duty to defend.”154 Now, the
Avalos court announced, it was presented with just the situation it had
posited in Pine Oak.155
The Avalos court examined the record and easily determined that the
Hurtados’ allegations that were intended to trigger Loya’s duties to defend and indemnify Guevara were false.156 The evidence demonstrated
that Flores—not Guevara—was driving Guevera’s car at the time of the
accident.157 The trial court had practically begged the Hurtados to point
to evidence that someone other than Flores was driving the car that hit
them, which would have spared them summary judgment, but they could
not do so (because no such evidence existed).158 With respect to collusion, it was clear that Flores, Guevara, and the Hurtados had agreed to lie
about who was driving Guevara’s car “to trigger Guevara’s insurance
coverage and [Loya’s] duty to defend.”159 Guevara’s deposition testimony was conclusive evidence of the parties’ scheme.160
The Avalos court concluded that given the eight-corners rule’s contractual piers, the rule does not preclude courts from considering “extrinsic
evidence regarding collusive fraud by the insured in determining the insurer’s duty to defend.”161 Although an insurer must defend its insured
against fraudulent allegations by a third-party, “the insurer [never]
agreed to undertake, and the insured has not paid for, a duty to defend
149. Avalos v. Loya Ins. Co., 592 S.W.3d 138, 145–46 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018),
rev’d, 610 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2020).
150. See Avalos, 610 S.W.3d at 879 (noting that the court was deciding the case on a
petition for review from the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas).
151. Id. at 881.
152. Id.
153. 279 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009).
154. Id. at 654 n.23.
155. Avalos, 610 S.W.3d at 882.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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the insured against fraudulent allegations brought about by the insured
itself.”162 Consequently, “an insurer owes no duty to defend when there
is conclusive evidence that groundless, false, or fraudulent claims against
the insured have been manipulated by the insured’s own hands . . . to
secure a defense and coverage where they would not otherwise exist.”163
Retreating, the Hurtados argued that even recognizing a collusive
fraud exception to the eight-corners rule, the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment because the exception surfaced in their suit against
Loya for breaching its duty to defend, not in a declaratory judgment action by Loya before it withdrew Guevara’s defense.164 According to the
Hurtados, an insurer should have to obtain a judicial declaration that it
has no duty to defend before it may pull a defense.165 Without such a
determination, the Hurtados contended, “an insurer confronted with undisputed evidence of collusive fraud designed to trigger its duty to defend
must continue defending its insured.”166 The Avalos court rejected this
argument for two reasons.167
First, a declaratory judgment action requires a justiciable controversy,
and an insurer presented with clear evidence of its insured’s collusion
might conclude that there is no justiciable controversy.168 Nor would requiring an insurer to pursue “a declaratory judgment action promote
prompt and efficient dispute resolution if there is conclusive evidence
that the insured lied in order to secure a defense and coverage.”169 To the
contrary, making an insurer prosecute a declaratory judgment action in
this situation would waste the parties’ time, increase their expenses,
squander judicial resources, and hamper insurers’ ability to promptly determine their defense and possible indemnity obligations.170 Second, an
insurance company that breaches its duty to defend risks significant liability under several causes of action.171 That threat should help ensure that
insurers will withdraw a defense without first obtaining a declaratory
judgment only in slam-dunk cases.172 For that matter, the Avalos court
urged insurers generally to pursue declaratory judgment actions to ascertain their duty to defend.173
The Avalos court concluded that when deciding whether an insurer
owes a duty to defend, “a court may consider extrinsic evidence regarding
whether the insured and a third party suing the insured colluded to make
false representations of fact in that suit for the purpose of securing a de162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(emphasis omitted).

at 882–83.
at 883.

at 884.
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fense and coverage where they would not otherwise exist.”174 Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate court and
reinstated the trial court judgment for Loya.175
2. Analysis
The Avalos court reached the correct result. While an insured can reasonably expect her insurer to defend her against a third party’s fraudulent
allegations, she cannot reasonably believe that her insurer will defend her
against fraudulent claims that she helped fabricate.176 Of course, as noted
earlier, the risk of collusion between an insured and a plaintiff is one of
the eight-corners rule’s material disadvantages.177
The parties’ conduct in Avalos satisfied any possible definition of collusion.178 In terms of considering the use of extrinsic evidence to excuse an
insurer’s duty to defend, whether in Texas or elsewhere, however, it must
be understood that false allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint or petition,
without more, do not evidence or equal collusion.179 Thus, “[t]he plaintiff
may try to plead the case [into] coverage and allege facts that are known
to be false. The insurer in [such a] case still has a duty to defend even if
the allegations are false or fraudulent.”180 Or, as a Texas federal court
recently wrote in National Liability & Fire Insurance Co. v. Young,181 a
plaintiff’s “[a]rtful pleading” or “gamesmanship” in crafting allegations
or amending a pleading to assert facts that trigger coverage does not constitute collusion justifying an insurer’s resort to extrinsic evidence to ex174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Brief for Texas Ass’n of Defense Counsel as Amicus Curiae Supporting Loya Insurance at 2, Loya Ins. Co. v. Avalos, No. 18-0837, 2018 WL 6830055 (Tex. May 1, 2020).
177. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 699.
178. Different dictionaries define collusion differently. Compare Collusion, AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 363 (4th ed. 2009) (defining collusion as “[a] secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent, illegal, or
deceitful purpose”), with Collusion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (9th ed. 2009) (defining collusion as “[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain something forbidden by law”). Relatedly, dictionaries are imperfect sources of authority when fixing the
meaning of words, as courts and scholars have observed when interpreting statutes. See,
e.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he choice among
meanings [of words in statutes] must have a footing more solid than a dictionary—which is
a museum of words, an historical catalog rather than a means to decode the work of legislatures.” (alteration in original) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994))). Even courts
that consider dictionaries to be helpful when attempting to define statutory terms recognize that dictionary definitions are not dispositive. See, e.g., Austin v. Medicis, 230 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 528, 538 (Ct. App. 2018) (“[W]hile dictionaries may sometimes be helpful, they
are not dispositive.”); State v. White, 583 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (“[W]hile
the dictionary is frequently used as a tool in statutory interpretation, a dictionary definition
is not the final source of guidance as to a word’s plain and ordinary meaning.”); State v.
Carlton, 388 P.3d 1093, 1097 (Or. 2017) (“[D]ictionary definitions are guides for discernment, not blunt instruments.”).
179. R. Brent Cooper, Rules Governing the Use of Extrinsic Evidence in the Duty to
Defend—Proposals and Predictions, 10 J. TEX. INS. L. 12, 22 (2010).
180. Id.
181. 459 F. Supp. 3d 796 (N.D. Tex. 2020).
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cuse its duty to defend.182 The insurer in such a case must instead focus
on proving the falsity of the plaintiff’s allegations in what will hopefully
be the successful defense of the insured.183
Although the Avalos court understandably focused on the parties’ collusion to find a way around the eight-corners rule, it could have characterized Guevara’s misconduct as a breach of her duty to cooperate and
affirmed Loya’s withdrawal of its defense on that basis.184 To be sure,
Guevara’s collusion with the Hurtados still would have been the conduct
constituting the breach,185 but recognizing a breach of the duty to cooperate as an exception to the eight-corners rule would have firmly rooted the
exception in the language of the insurance policy. Such a result also
would have avoided any arguable first step down the proverbial slippery
slope that public policy exceptions to established rules are sometimes said
to produce.186
To briefly explain, the insured’s “duty to cooperate is essentially the
flip side of the insurer’s duty to defend.”187 Standard insurance policies
include a cooperation clause.188 For example, the standard personal auto
policy states: “A person seeking any coverage must . . . [c]ooperate with
[the insurance company] in the investigation, settlement or defense of any
claim or suit.”189 Even if a liability insurance policy did not include a
cooperation clause, however, the insured’s duty to cooperate with the insurer in the defense of a lawsuit would be implied.190 As a matter of contract law, where one party to an agreement promises to perform a duty
that requires some degree of cooperation by the other party, a duty to
cooperate is imposed on the second party.191 In fact, a principal purpose
of a cooperation clause is to prevent collusion between an insured and a
third party.192
A possible negative aspect of relying on a breach of the duty to cooperate to excuse an insurer’s duty to defend, rather than what amounts to a
182. Id. at 801–02; see also Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., 758 F.
Supp. 2d 414, 420 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (“Artful pleading, absent evidence of collusion between
the third-party claimant and the insured, does not create an exception to the general
rule.”).
183. Young, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 802 (quoting GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd.
Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. 2006)).
184. See WINDT, supra note 20, at § 4:4 (stating that an insured’s breach of the duty to
cooperate is an exception to the rule that an insurer cannot use extrinsic evidence to extinguish its duty to defend).
185. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 682 (describing an insured’s collusion
with a claimant as “a glaring breach of the duty to cooperate”).
186. I do not mean to suggest that to be the result of the Avalos decision.
187. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 681.
188. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1426 (2020).
189. Personal Auto Policy, supra note 2, at 11.
190. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 681.
191. Id.
192. See Am. Access Cas. Co. v. Alassouli, 31 N.E.3d 803, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (“A
cooperation clause prevents collusion between the insured and injured and enables an insurer to prepare its defense to a claim.”); Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 295 P.3d 201, 205
(Wash. 2013) (“Cooperation clauses also guard against collusion and fraud.”).
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public policy exception in a case of collusion, is that an insurer generally
must show that it was prejudiced by the insured’s noncooperation to deny
coverage.193 On the other hand, it should be a rare case where an insured’s collusion does not materially and substantially prejudice the insurer’s defense of the lawsuit against the insured.194
III. RULES FOR THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
EXCUSE AN INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND
A. GENERAL GUIDANCE CONCERNING
EVIDENCE

THE

USE

OF

EXTRINSIC

Jurisdictions differ on whether and when insurers may rely on extrinsic
evidence to excuse their duty to defend where a plaintiff’s complaint or
petition alleges facts that raise the potential for coverage, but it is possible to state some general rules regarding the use of extrinsic evidence in
this context. In doing so, it is first important to recognize that there are
three essential categories of extrinsic evidence: (1) evidence that relates
solely to the merits of the plaintiff’s allegations against the insured; (2)
evidence that relates solely to the insurer’s duty to indemnify the insured—that is, which goes solely to the question of coverage under the
policy at issue; and (3) evidence that relates both to the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims and to coverage, evidence which might be described as
overlapping evidence.195 Alternatively, it might be said that there are
three categories of “actual facts” or “true facts” that courts must consider
when deciding whether an insurer should be allowed to extinguish its
duty to defend: (1) liability facts; (2) coverage or nonliability facts; and
(3) mixed facts.196
Generally, an insurer cannot rely on extrinsic evidence that relates
solely to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims against the insured or on overlapping evidence to excuse its duty to defend where the plaintiff has
pleaded facts that raise the potential for coverage.197 Where extrinsic evidence relates exclusively to the issue of coverage, on the other hand, an
insurer should be allowed to rely on that evidence to excuse its duty to
defend notwithstanding the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings.198 An
193. Spore v. GEICO Indem. Co., 497 S.W.3d 704, 709 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016); Xtreme
Prot. Servs., LLC v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 143 N.E.3d 128, 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); Breaux v.
Cozy Cottages, LLC, 151 So. 3d 183, 190 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
194. See generally Xtreme, 143 N.E.3d at 138 (“Proof of substantial prejudice requires
an insurer to demonstrate that it was actually hampered in its defense by the violation of
the cooperation clause.” (quoting M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 363 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ill.
1977))).
195. Ellen S. Pryor, Mapping the Changing Boundaries of the Duty to Defend in Texas,
31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 869, 880 (2000).
196. See Barker, supra note 10, at 20 (referring to “actual facts,” “liability facts,” “nonliability facts,” and “[m]ixed facts”).
197. See, e.g., GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305,
308–10 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that the insurer could not rely on extrinsic evidence related
to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims or overlapping evidence to escape its duty to defend).
198. See, e.g., Bartkowiak v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 39 N.E.3d 176, 181 (Ill. App. Ct.
2015) (“[P]rovided that the trial court is not, in effect, adjudicating a critical issue in the
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insurer should also be allowed to use extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty
to defend even if the evidence arguably relates to the merits of the allegations against the insured or might be seen as overlapping evidence where
the evidence is incontrovertible.199 Obvious examples are cases in which
the insured has been convicted of a crime that establishes the intent to
harm the plaintiff or victim, or the insured’s conviction of any crime that
triggers a criminal act, criminal conviction, or illegal act exclusion in the
subject insurance policy.200
B. SPECIFIC INSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE USE OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
RELATED SOLELY TO COVERAGE TO EXCUSE THE INSURER’S
DUTY TO DEFEND
The circumstances in which extrinsic evidence will relate solely to coverage, and accordingly may be used by the insurer to excuse its duty to
defend, will vary by case.201 In Talen v. Employers Mutual Casualty
Co.,202 for example, the court held that the insurer had no duty to defend
despite the ambiguous allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint because the
“refusal to employ” exclusion in the insured’s policy meant that the plaintiff could not recover economic damages against the insured under any of
his legal theories.203
By way of further example, the insureds in Kepner v. Western Fire Insurance Co.,204 Harry and Velma Kepner, had a homeowner’s policy with
Western that contained a business pursuits exclusion.205 Harry Kepner
ran his business, Harry’s Pool Service, out of their home.206 The Kepners’
grandson, Walter, was injured when a Harry’s Pool Service employee was
using a power saw during a project to convert the carport at the Kepners’
house into an office for the business.207 Walter’s parents sued the
Kepners on his behalf, but the complaint was silent on whether the use of
the power saw was related to Harry Kepner’s business.208 The Arizona
underlying case, there is no reason why the trial court could not consider relevant, objective, undisputed facts in deciding the duty to defend, even if those facts fall outside the
pleadings of the underlying lawsuit.”); Blake v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 904 A.2d 1071, 1076
(Vt. 2006) (“Although in many cases the presence of a duty to defend can be determined
by comparing . . . the policy with . . . the complaint, this is not such a case because the
relevant policy exclusions involve factual questions not covered in the complaint, namely,
whether the accident occurred in the scope of employment.”).
199. Barker, supra note 10, at 8.
200. See id. (discussing an insured’s admission of an intentional assault and an insured’s
criminal conviction for assault).
201. See generally Michael Menapace, Going Beyond the Four Corners to Deny a Defense: A Critique of Section 13(3) of the Restatement of Liability Insurance, 53 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 795 (2018) (discussing the varied circumstances in which courts have
approved of insurers’ consideration of extrinsic evidence in denying a defense notwithstanding the eight-corners rule).
202. 703 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 2005).
203. Id. at 407.
204. 509 P.2d 222 (Ariz. 1973).
205. Id. at 223.
206. Id. at 222–23.
207. Id. at 223.
208. Id.

148

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

Supreme Court held that Western had no duty to defend because, while
the facts alleged in the complaint ostensibly brought the case within coverage, other facts outside the complaint defeated coverage by implicating
the business pursuits exclusion.209 More to the point, the extrinsic facts
that demonstrated that the pool service employee using the power saw
was working for the business at the time of the accident were irrelevant to
the merits of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit.210
Although the circumstances in which an insurance company may rely
on extrinsic evidence that relates solely to coverage to excuse its duty to
defend are case and fact specific, some situations stand out.211
1. The Party Seeking a Defense Is Not an Insured
First, an insurer should be allowed to rely on extrinsic evidence to establish that the party seeking a defense is not an insured under the relevant policy.212 For example, an insurer should be allowed to use extrinsic
evidence to show that the party seeking a defense does not fall within the
subject policy’s definition of an insured,213 or that an insured’s policy was
canceled at such a time as to excuse the insurer’s performance.214
Weingarten Realty Management Co. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
Co.215 is an interesting Texas Court of Appeals case decided before Richards and Avalos in which the court held that the insurer could use extrinsic evidence to extinguish its duty to defend a party it did not insure.216
Weingarten arose out of a criminal attack on Connie Johnson, who managed a store named Fashion Cents.217 Johnson sued her employer, Norstan Apparel Shops (Norstan), which used the Fashion Cents business
name, and Weingarten Realty Management Co. (Weingarten Management), which she alleged was Fashion Cents’ landlord.218 Norstan actually
leased the Fashion Cents space from a separate company, Weingarten
Realty Investors (Weingarten Investors).219
Norstan’s lease with Weingarten Investors required Norstan to obtain a
CGL policy naming Weingarten Investors as an additional insured.220
209. Id. at 224, 226.
210. See id. at 224 (“The proof of negligence proximately causing Walter Kepner’s injuries justifies a judgment favorable to him, but the fact that the insureds’ policy excludes
coverage is irrelevant . . . .”).
211. The following list of situations is not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive.
212. PIH Beaverton LLC v. Red Shield Ins. Co., 412 P.3d 234, 240 (Or. Ct. App. 2018)
(citing Fred Shearer & Sons, Inc. v. Gemini Ins. Co., 240 P.3d 67, 73 (Or. Ct. App. 2010));
RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13(3)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
213. See Fred Shearer & Sons, 240 P.3d at 73 (explaining the rationale for departing
from the eight-corners rule in this context).
214. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 707 A.2d 384, 386 (Me. 1998) (quoting
Am. Policyholders’ Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247, 250 (Me.
1977)).
215. 343 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
216. Id. at 865.
217. Id. at 860.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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Norstan obtained a policy with Liberty Mutual that named all of Norstan’s lessors as additional insureds.221 Meanwhile, Weingarten Management was separately insured under a CGL policy with Scottsdale
Insurance Co. (Scottsdale).222 When Johnson sued Weingarten Management, the company defended itself until it exhausted its self-insured retention, at which time Scottsdale assumed the defense.223
Weingarten Management finally demanded that Liberty Mutual take
over its defense as an additional insured under the Norstan policy, but
Liberty Mutual refused.224 Weingarten Management defeated Johnson at
trial.225 Weingarten Management and Scottsdale then sued Liberty Mutual to recover their defense costs, asserting that Liberty Mutual had
breached its duty to defend Weingarten Management because Johnson
had named the company as Norstan’s landlord in her petition.226 Weingarten Management and Scottsdale conceded that Weingarten Management was not Norstan’s landlord but contended that Johnson’s “mistaken
allegation gave rise to a duty to defend because the ‘eight-corners rule’
restricted the trial court from looking outside the pleadings and insurance
policy to determine Weingarten Management was not the true lessor.”227
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.228 In weighing
the motions, “the trial court examined evidence extrinsic to Johnson’s petition . . . and the Liberty Mutual policy to determine [that] Weingarten
Management was not a lessor and therefore was not entitled to coverage
under the Liberty Mutual policy’s ‘additional insured’ endorsement.”229
The trial court granted Liberty Mutual’s summary judgment motion, and
Weingarten Management and Scottsdale appealed.230
On appeal, Weingarten Management and Scottsdale contended that
the trial court improvidently awarded Liberty Mutual summary judgment
because it erroneously considered extrinsic evidence in doing so rather
than adhering to the eight-corners rule.231 But the Weingarten court reasoned that the appellants’ eight-corners rule argument missed the mark:
The rationale behind the eight-corners rule is to require insurers to
defend the insured against all claims, even those without merit. To
the insured, a meritless claim still requires a defense. But the protection the eight-corners rule provides exists for the benefit only of the
insured. It is the insured who is entitled to trust that his insurer will
defend him against all covered claims, meritorious or not. A stranger
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 860–61.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 862.
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to the policy neither needs nor should expect this benefit.232
Consistent with the quoted language, Liberty Mutual argued that it had
no duty to defend Weingarten Management because it was not an additional insured under the Norstan policy “and, as a total stranger to the
policy, [was] not entitled to a defense against any claim.”233 Enforcing the
eight-corners rule here would serve no purpose traditionally assigned to
the rule.234 Rather than disputing the merits of Johnson’s suit, Liberty
Mutual had based its refusal to defend on a “pure coverage” issue.235
On these facts, the Weingarten court saw the utility of “a very narrow
exception to the eight-corners rule.”236 As the court explained, “[t]he exception applies only when an insurer establishes by extrinsic evidence
that a party seeking a defense is a stranger to the policy and could not be
entitled to a defense under any set of facts.”237 For this limited exception
to apply, “the extrinsic evidence must go strictly to an issue of coverage
without contradicting any allegation in the third-party claimant’s pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim.”238
Weingarten Management and Scottsdale tried to escape the court’s exception to the eight-corners rule by arguing that the extrinsic evidence
here related to the merits of Johnson’s claims as well as to coverage.239
They reasoned that Weingarten Management’s alleged status as Norstan’s
landlord was relevant to Johnson’s alleged status as Fashion Cents’ invitee, such that Weingarten Management owed her a duty of care.240 Weingarten Management and Scottsdale further argued that, because
Weingarten Management had a right of control over the Fashion Cents
space under the Norstan lease, Weingarten Management’s alleged status
as Norstan’s landlord was key to “the scope of the duty owed to Johnson.”241 The Weingarten court, however, easily dispatched these
arguments:
It is true that in a claim properly brought against an insurer by an
actual insured, the existence and terms of a lease could be a significant factor in determining whether a landlord retained control over a
leased premises. But here Liberty Mutual seeks to introduce evidence that Weingarten Management is not a lessor not to undermine
the merits of the plaintiff’s claim but to establish that Weingarten
Management is a stranger to the policy. The appellants may see the
lessor allegation as important to the merits of their case, but Liberty
Mutual’s interest in contradicting it is confined to disputing Wein232. Id. at 864–65 (citation omitted).
233. Id. at 865.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (citing GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305,
310 (Tex. 2006)).
239. Id. at 868.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 868–69.
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garten Management’s status as an “insured.”242
Weingarten Management was never insured with Liberty Mutual and
its only claim to a defense from Liberty Mutual was its mistaken identification as Norstan’s lessor in Johnson’s petition.243 It was therefore proper
for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence in awarding Liberty Mutual summary judgment.244
2. The Vehicle or Other Property Involved in the Occurrence Is Not
Covered Under the Policy in Question
Second, an insurer should be allowed to use extrinsic evidence to deny
a duty to defend where the vehicle or other property involved in the occurrence is not covered under the policy under which a defense is demanded and there is no other potential basis for coverage.245 In Rowell v.
Hodges,246 for example, the insured, Hardy Hodges, owned a 1958 Cadillac and a 1955 Cadillac.247 He insured the 1958 Cadillac with Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co. (NMIC).248 Hodges was in an accident while
driving his 1955 Cadillac.249 NMIC investigated the accident and established that Hodges was driving his 1955 Cadillac at the time of the accident—not his insured 1958 model.250
A minor passenger in the other car involved in the accident and her
father sued Hodges but pleaded only that Hodges was “operating ‘an automobile’” at the time of the accident.251 NMIC declined to defend
Hodges in the lawsuit because he was not driving the insured vehicle and
therefore did not qualify as an insured.252 The plaintiffs obtained a
$20,000 judgment against Hodges and thereafter tried to collect the judgment through a garnishment action against NMIC.253
The Rowell court determined that NMIC acceptably relied on extrinsic
evidence in declining to defend Hodges.254 As the court explained:
In a sense, to say here that the [NMIC] must gauge its obligation
strictly by the . . . Complaint, and put blinders on, so to speak, to
what it actually knows and has definitely ascertained, is somewhat
242. Id. at 869.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13(3)(b) (AM. L. INST. 2019); see, e.g.,
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Keen, 658 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(“The insured conceded to the carrier shortly after the incident that a critical and objective
fact placed any claim beyond coverage, i.e. that he operated the [boat] with an engine more
powerful than the coverage afforded. That concession was backed up by corroborative
evidence.”).
246. 434 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1970).
247. Id. at 928.
248. Id. at 927–28.
249. Id. at 928.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 929.
252. Id. at 928.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 930.
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archaic, considering the nature of our present system of notice pleading. The Court simply cannot find any just or logical reason why it
should be held that the mere allegation . . . that Hardy Hodges was
operating ‘an automobile’ thereby invokes a contractual obligation
to defend the suit brought by the Plaintiffs, when reality, i.e., the
actual identity of the vehicle involved in the accident, told everybody
that there was not and never had been any insurance coverage for . . .
Hodges, in the first place.255
As a result, the plaintiffs were not entitled to collect their judgments from
NMIC.256
3. The Underlying Harm Occurred Outside the Policy Period
Most liability insurance policies are occurrence based, meaning that the
insurer has a duty to defend and indemnify the insured when the bodily
injury or property damage is caused by an “occurrence.”257 Standard liability policies typically define the term occurrence to mean “an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.”258 Furthermore, the “bodily injury” or “property damage” caused by the occurrence must occur during the policy
period for coverage to lie.259 “In most cases, the damage occurs at the
same time as the event, so it is often said that occurrence policies provide
coverage if the event insured against takes place during the policy period,
regardless of when the claim is presented.”260
That explanation lays the foundation for the third exception to the
eight-corners rule, which recognizes that an insurer should be allowed to
use extrinsic evidence to show that it owes no duty to defend where the
injury or damage being sued over occurred outside the policy period.261
In Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Hyster-Yale Group, Inc.,262 for example, the court held that the insurer had no duty to defend asbestos personal injury cases against its insured where it could establish that the
plaintiff’s injury occurred outside the effective dates of the policy under
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., CGL Coverage Form, supra note 2, at 1.
258. Id. at 15.
259. Id. at 1.
260. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 423.
261. See, e.g., Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1416, 1423–27
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (permitting consideration of extrinsic evidence and concluding that because Travelers would be unable to demonstrate that any events relevant to the underlying
actions occurred during the coverage periods of two other insurers, Highlands and Commercial Union (CU), Travelers would not be entitled to a declaration that Highlands and
CU had to indemnify Avondale, and the court could therefore determine that Highlands
and CU were relieved of any duty to defend Avondale); Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. C de Baca,
907 P.2d 210, 214 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (“Of course, when the question of coverage turns
on whether the events alleged in the complaint occurred during the policy period, it is
necessary to look outside the four corners of the complaint. The complaint will provide no
information on the effective dates of the policy.”).
262. 135 N.E.3d 499 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019).
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which coverage was sought.263 Similarly, in Polarome International, Inc. v.
Greenwich Insurance Co.,264 a New Jersey court held that where the
plaintiffs’ complaints were ambiguous, two insurers could rely on extrinsic evidence establishing that the plaintiffs’ chemical exposure had ceased
and their injuries were diagnosed before the insurers’ policies took effect.265 As a result, the insurers did not breach their duties to defend the
insured when they withdrew their defenses based on extrinsic facts they
learned in their investigations of the plaintiffs’ allegations.266
4. Lateness Under a Claims-Made-and-Reported or Claims-Made
Policy
Fourth, an insurer should be allowed to use extrinsic evidence to deny a
duty to defend where the insured is covered under a claims-made-andreported insurance policy and does not report the claim to the insurer
within the policy period or any extended reporting period.267 To briefly
explain, a claims-made-and-reported policy differs from an occurrencebased policy in key respects.268 For there to be coverage under a claimsmade-and-reported policy, a claim against the insured must be made
within the policy period, and the insured must report the claim to the
insurance company within the policy period or within an extended reporting period provided for in the policy.269 An extended reporting period in
a claims-made-and-reported policy extends the insured’s time in which to
report a claim for some specified period (e.g., sixty days) after the end of
the policy period and still receive coverage.270
Claims-made-and-reported policies are often referred to as “claimsmade” policies,271 although there are, in fact, differences between the two
types of policies.272 Quickly, under a claims-made policy, coverage is triggered when a claim is made against the insured within the policy period.273 A claims-made policy, much like an occurrence-based policy, then
requires the insured to provide notice of the claim to the insurer “‘as
soon as practicable’ or within a stated period.”274 Just as an insurer
should be able to use extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty to defend
under a claims-made-and-reported policy, so too should it be able to
263. Id. at 507.
264. 961 A.2d 29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
265. Id. at 50.
266. Id.
267. RESTATEMENT OF THE L. OF LIAB. INS. § 13(3)(c) (AM. L. INST. 2019).
268. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 422–23 (explaining the differences between occurrence-based and claims-made-and-reported policies).
269. Id. at 423.
270. See, e.g., Aspen Square, Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:18-CV-02255-JAR-JPO,
2019 WL 1115261, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2019) (quoting the basic extended reporting
period in a claims-made-and-reported insurance policy).
271. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 9, at 423.
272. See Anderson v. Aul, 862 N.W.2d 304, 311 (Wis. 2015) (explaining the differences
between claims-made and claims-made-and-reported insurance policies).
273. Id.
274. Id.
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avoid its duty to defend where it can show, based on extrinsic evidence,
that a claim was not timely asserted under a claims-made policy.275
Edwards v. Lexington Insurance Co.276 is the leading case for the proposition that an insurer may use extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty to
defend under a claims-made or claims-made-and-reported policy.277 In
October 2002, Ernest Edwards was injured when his Game Tracker safety
harness malfunctioned, and he fell from the tree stand he was using to
hunt.278 He obtained a default judgment of nearly $2 million against
Game Tracker after Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington) declined
to defend Game Tracker against Edwards’s lawsuit under any of the three
policies that Lexington had issued to the company.279 One of those policies was a claims-made policy; Lexington contended that Edwards never
notified either it or Game Tracker of his claim against Game Tracker during the policy period, which ran from April 2002 to June 2003.280
Edwards sued Lexington to satisfy his judgment against Game Tracker,
which was bankrupt.281 “During discovery, Lexington sought proof that
Edwards had provided notice within the [policy] period.”282 Edwards was
unable to say whether he had given notice of his claim to Game Tracker
or Lexington during the policy period.283 In fact, the only evidence in the
record established that Edwards did not give Game Tracker formal notice
of his injury until January 2004.284 Based on Edwards’s inability to offer
evidence that he had timely given notice of his claim to Game Tracker or
Lexington, the district court found that “the claims-made insurance policy
did not cover Edwards’[s] claim” and awarded Lexington summary
judgment.285
On appeal to the First Circuit, Edwards argued that under controlling
Maine law, the district court was bound to apply the eight-corners rule to
determine Lexington’s duty to defend.286 Thus, he reasoned, the district
court erred by relying on extrinsic evidence to decide that Lexington had
no duty to defend Game Tracker.287
The court rejected Edwards’s argument.288 As the court explained, the
eight-corners rule “is appropriately invoked in the context of occurrence
275. See, e.g., Hasbrouck v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Iowa
1993) (affirming summary judgment for the insurer based on evidence outside the scope of
the pleadings where the insured provided late notice of a medical malpractice claim under
a claims-made policy).
276. 507 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2007).
277. Id. at 40–41.
278. Id. at 38.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 38–39.
281. Id. at 39.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 40.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 40–41.
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policies because the complaint in describing the incident will usually provide adequate information to determine whether—at least as alleged—
the incident is within the scope of the insurance policy.”289 But the eightcorners rule cannot be inflexibly applied to “claims-made policies where
the determinative event is the timing of the claim, a fact that likely will
be—and in this case was—irrelevant to the merits of the underlying tort
suit, and therefore absent from the pleadings.”290 Therefore, the district
court did not err in granting Lexington’s summary judgment motion on
this point.291 After considering additional arguments, the Edwards court
affirmed the district court’s judgment for Lexington.292
5. Collusion or Other Lack of Cooperation
As we saw in Avalos, an insured’s collusion with a claimant justifies the
insurer’s use of extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty to defend.293 Of
course, proof of collusion requires extrinsic evidence, and there is no
valid reason to effectively foster or tolerate collusion by insureds through
strict adherence to the eight-corners rule. Other forms of noncooperation
established through extrinsic evidence may also excuse an insurer’s duty
to defend regardless of the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint
or petition.294
C. INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
DEFENSE

A

COVERAGE

As noted above, an insurer should also be able to use extrinsic evidence to refuse a defense, even if the evidence arguably relates to the
merits of the allegations against the insured or qualifies as overlapping
evidence, where the evidence is incontrovertible. Ready examples include
cases (1) where the insured has been convicted of a crime that establishes
the intent to harm the plaintiff or the victim; or (2) where the insured’s
conviction of a crime triggers a criminal act, criminal conviction, or illegal
act exclusion in the subject insurance policy.295 In such cases, the court
may hold that the insured’s criminal conviction collaterally estops the in289. Id. (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 473 F.3d 596, 599–600 (5th Cir. 2006)).
290. Id. at 41.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 41–43.
293. Loya Ins. Co. v. Avalos, 610 S.W.3d 878, 882, 884 (Tex. 2020).
294. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 707 A.2d 384, 386 (Me. 1998) (quoting
Am. Policyholders’ Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247, 250 (Me.
1977)); WINDT, supra note 20, at § 4:4.
295. Generally, to trigger a criminal act exclusion, an insurer must establish that the
insured committed a criminal act, but the insurer is not required to also show that the
insured intended to injure the plaintiff or victim. See SECURA Supreme Ins. Co. v.
M.S.M., 755 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (describing this approach as the majority rule). But see Webb v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 457 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020)
(“[A] criminal act exclusion . . . [applies] only to serious criminal conduct ‘done with malicious intent, from evil nature, or with a wrongful disposition to harm or injure other persons or property.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raynor, 21 P.3d
707, 712 (Wash. 2001))).
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sured from denying any intent to harm the plaintiff or victim,296 or the
court may treat the insured’s conviction as dispositive of the insured’s
intent to harm with no mention of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion.297
1. Criminal Conviction Establishing an Intentional Injury
Standard liability insurance policies do not insure against insureds’ intentional injury of third parties for two reasons.298 First, occurrencebased policies define the term occurrence to mean “an accident,”299 and
an insured’s intentional injury of a third party is no accident.300 Second,
standard insurance policies include intentional acts exclusions that typically exclude coverage for bodily injury or property damage “expected or
intended by an ‘insured,’” albeit with an exception for the use of reasonable force to protect persons or property.301 Thus, an insured’s criminal act
that includes intent as an element cannot be considered an occurrence
and should operate to excuse the insurer’s duty to defend because there is
no possibility of coverage under the policy. Relatedly, an insurer should
be able to offer evidence of an insured’s criminal conviction to excuse its
duty to defend under an intentional acts exclusion even if the plaintiff
alleges that the insured negligently caused the subject harm.302 American
296. See, e.g., Esurance Ins. Co. v. Hamm, 387 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (D. Or. 2019)
(explaining that the insured’s guilty plea and conviction had a preclusive effect with respect
to whether the victim’s injury was the reasonably expected result of an insured’s criminal
act); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1275–76 (D. Or. 2015) (applying
issue preclusion and stating that an insurer “has no duty to defend when a criminal conviction incontrovertibly establishes the insurer does not cover an injury”).
297. See, e.g., Century Sur. Co. v. Seidel, 893 F.3d 328, 333–36 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying
Texas law in connection with a criminal act exclusion).
298. As the following text explains, an insured’s allegedly wrongful act may not constitute an “occurrence” and it may further fall within a policy exclusion. The fact that an act
or event does not qualify as an “occurrence” and is also excluded from coverage does not
make either the “occurrence” aspect of the insuring agreement or the exclusion surplusage.
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Am. Grain Distribs., LLC, 958 F.3d 748, 757 (8th Cir. 2020)
(applying Missouri law).
299. CGL Coverage Form, supra note 2, at 15; Homeowners 3–Special Form, supra
note 2, at 2.
300. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 18 F. Supp. 3d 156, 163 (D. Conn. 2014) (finding it clear from the complaint in the underlying action that the plaintiff’s negligence claims
arose out of her intentional sexual assault by two insureds, such that the complaint did not
allege an accident, and therefore Allstate had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds
because there was no occurrence); USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Carr, 225 A.3d 357, 360–62 (Del.
2020) (explaining that whether an incident is an accident in the context of a liability insurance policy must be determined from the insured’s viewpoint and concluding that a teenager’s senseless assault on a classmate was not an accident); Lambert v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am., 87 So. 3d 1123, 1128 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (finding that because the insured intentionally fired his pistol at the car in which the decedent was riding, there was no accident or
occurrence).
301. Homeowners 3–Special Form, supra note 2, at 19; CGL Coverage Form, supra
note 2, at 2.
302. See, e.g., W. Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Wipf, 702 F. App’x 542, 544 (9th Cir. 2017)
(applying Washington law); Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 739 N.E.2d 445, 453–54
(Ill. 2000) (concluding that the insured’s criminal conviction for first-degree murder collaterally estopped the administrator of the victim’s estate from contending that the victim’s
injury was not expected or intended); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 38 (Me.
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Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas303 is a representative case.
In Savickas, Michael Savickas shot and killed Thomas Vinicky.304
Savickas was convicted of first degree murder.305 The administrator of
Vinicky’s estate, Elizabeth Vinicky, sued Savickas for wrongful death.306
Her amended complaint included four causes of action, two of which alleged an intentional tort by Savickas and two that alleged that Savickas
had either negligently shot Thomas or had negligently assessed his need
to defend himself against Thomas.307 Savickas tendered his defense to his
homeowner’s carrier, American Family.308 American Family agreed to
defend Savickas but promptly filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify him.309
American Family moved for summary judgment in the declaratory
judgment action based on the intentional acts exclusion in its policy,
which stated that coverage did not apply “to bodily injury or property
damage ‘which [was] expected or intended by any insured.’”310 American
Family supported its motion with a certified copy of Savickas’s conviction, a copy of the appellate opinion affirming Savickas’s conviction, and
excerpts from the transcript of Savickas’s criminal trial in which he admitted that he intentionally shot Thomas Vinicky.311 The trial court granted
American Family’s summary judgment motion but an appellate court reversed, reasoning that the negligence allegations in the complaint triggered American Family’s duty to defend.312
American Family appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held
that Savickas’s murder conviction collaterally estopped him from denying
1991) (“[M]urder, attempted murder and sexual abuse of a child convictions are narrow
exceptions to the general rule that determines a duty to defend solely from the insurance
contract and the allegations of the complaint.”); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Sprague, 415
N.W.2d 230, 232 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“The trial court did not err in concluding, based on
the conviction and on the deposition evidence presented, that there was no genuine issue
of material fact as to whether [the insured] expected or intended to kill [the victim]. Therefore, there was no duty to defend or provide coverage.”); Burns v. Underwriters Adjusting
Co., 765 P.2d 712, 712–13 (Mont. 1988) (explaining that the insured pled guilty to felony
aggravated assault and that the allegations of negligence in the plaintiff’s complaint did not
determine the insurers’ duty to defend); Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lapi, 596 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887
(App. Div. 1993) (reasoning that the insured’s guilty plea trumped his incredible claim that
he did not mean to injure the plaintiff and rejecting the insured’s transparent attempt to
manufacture insurance coverage); Cummings v. Lyles, 27 N.E.3d 985, 991 (Ohio Ct. App.
2015) (stating that the insured’s plea to felonious assault created a rebuttable presumption
of intent to harm); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 785, 788–89 (R.I. 1995) (involving
the sexual molestation of a minor and inferring the intent to harm as a matter of insurance
law).
303. 739 N.E.2d at 447.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 448.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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that he intentionally shot Thomas Vinicky.313 By finding Savickas guilty
of first degree murder, the jury in his criminal case “necessarily found
him either to have intended to kill the victim, or at least to have known
that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm.”314 That finding established that he “‘intended or expected’ the
result of his actions,” which was the dispositive issue in the declaratory
judgment action.315 There was a final judgment on the merits in
Savickas’s murder case—which he litigated to the hilt and to which he
was obviously a party—and a determination of his mental state was essential to his conviction.316 Finally, the court saw no “potential unfairness
to Savickas in estopping him with his criminal conviction.”317 After all, he
had “a full and fair opportunity to litigate all relevant issues in his criminal trial, and did so.”318
The Savickas court concluded that American Family could collaterally
estop Savickas with his criminal conviction which fixed his intent to harm
Thomas Vinicky.319 As a result, the intentional acts exclusion in the
American Family policy eliminated the insurer’s duties to defend and indemnify Savickas.320 Furthermore, because Elizabeth Vinicky stood in
Savickas’s shoes as his assignee, she could have no greater rights under
the American Family policy than he did.321 Thus, she was likewise precluded from claiming that Savickas negligently shot Thomas.322 In the
end, the Savickas court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the
trial court judgment for American Family.323
2. Criminal Conviction Perfecting a Related Exclusion
A liability policy may also include a criminal act, criminal conviction,
or illegal act exclusion, and just as an insurer should be allowed to offer
extrinsic evidence of an insured’s criminal conviction to deny a defense
based on the lack of an occurrence or the presence of an intentional acts
exclusion, so should an insurer be able to offer extrinsic evidence to enforce a criminal act, criminal conviction, or illegal act exclusion. Pompa v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co.324 is a leading case on this point.
In September 2002, David Pompa killed Steven Domianus.325 In May
2003, Pompa pled guilty to criminally negligent homicide.326 When Domianus’s heirs sued him for wrongful death, Pompa looked to his home313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id. at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 453–54.
Id. at 454.
520 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1141.
Id.
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owner’s insurer, American Family, for protection.327 American Family
declined to defend or indemnify him based principally upon the criminal
conviction exclusion in his policy,328 which provided that American Family would “not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of . . .
violation of any criminal law for which any insured is convicted.”329 The
heirs subsequently won a judgment of nearly $1 million against Pompa.330
Unable to satisfy the judgment, Pompa entered into a settlement agreement with the heirs in which he agreed to sue American Family for bad
faith and assign to them the lion’s share of any damages he recovered.331
Pompa sued American Family in a Colorado state court and American
Family removed the case to federal court.332 American Family prevailed
at summary judgment and Pompa appealed to the Tenth Circuit.333
On appeal, Pompa argued that the district court erred in considering
his negligent homicide conviction in holding that American Family had
no duty to defend him in the heirs’ wrongful death case.334 He contended
that the district court should have evaluated American Family’s duty to
defend strictly according to the eight-corners rule.335 The Tenth Circuit,
however, believed that the Colorado Supreme Court might well recognize an exception to the eight-corners rule if doing so did not undermine
the rule’s purposes.336 For example, the Colorado Supreme Court had
seemingly suggested in a 2004 case, Cotter Corp. v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co.,337 that it might recognize an exception to the
eight-corners rule where the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint were
designed to manufacture coverage.338
The Pompa court reasoned that this case fit within the exception to the
eight-corners rule that the Cotter court had hinted it might consider.339
Elaborating, the Pompa court made the case for the exception based on
the facts presented:
Mr. Pompa’s conviction is an indisputable fact that is not an element
of either the cause of action or a defense in the underlying litigation
(the wrongful-death case). Recognizing an exception in this circumstance would not undercut the policies supporting the complaint
rule. First, it would not defeat the legitimate expectations of the insured to a defense, because an insured can have no reasonable expectation of a defense when an indisputable fact, known to all
327.
328.
policy).
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Id. (stating that American Family also asserted the intentional acts exclusion in its
Id. at 1142 (alteration in original) (quoting the American Family policy).
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1141–42.
Id.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
90 P.3d 814 (Colo. 2004).
Id. at 829 n.9.
Pompa, 520 F.3d at 1147.
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parties, removes the act in question from coverage. That the complaint made no mention of Mr. Pompa’s conviction cannot turn an
expectation of a defense in these circumstances into a reasonable
one. Nor would recognition of this exception jeopardize the insured’s
defense in the underlying action, because the extrinsic fact is undisputed. . . . Moreover, recognizing this exception serves a beneficial
purpose: freeing an insurer from having to defend an action that
from the outset clearly falls outside the policy’s coverage . . . .340
The Pompa court acknowledged that the Colorado Supreme Court had
never adopted this specific exception to the eight-corners rule, but nor
had it ever been given the opportunity to do so.341 At the same time, the
one exception to the eight-corners rule on which the Cotter court had
expressly reserved judgment—a false allegation crafted to implicate insurance coverage—was “such a close cousin to the circumstance here”
that the Pompa court was willing to assume that the Colorado Supreme
Court would at least entertain it.342 “After all, the best evidence that an
allegation triggering coverage is not bona fide is that it is indisputably
untrue and is not necessary to establish liability in the underlying litigation.”343 The possible exception noted in Cotter would apply in this case if
the heirs’ wrongful death complaint had alleged that Pompa had not been
convicted of Domianus’s murder.344 That exception and the one the
Pompa court was endorsing were “almost mirror images of one another.”345 Furthermore:
[I]f one adopts an interpretation of the complaint rule that is consistent with the notion of a complaint under the rules of civil procedure,
our conclusion follows without any need to recognize an exception to
the rule. When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, Colorado courts may consider matters of which
they can take judicial notice even if not mentioned in the complaint.
In essence, judicially noticeable facts are incorporated into the complaint. Because the district court could have taken judicial notice of
Mr. Pompa’s conviction, that fact can be said to appear within the
four corners of the complaint.346
Given Pompa’s undisputed criminal conviction and the unambiguous
criminal conviction exclusion in his homeowner’s policy, American Family had no duty to defend him despite the negligence allegations in the
plaintiffs’ complaint.347 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary
judgment for American Family.348
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1147–48.
1148.
1148–49.
1149.

(citation omitted).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Under the eight-corners rule that many courts follow when deciding
whether an insurer owes a duty to defend, insurers have historically been
limited in their ability to use extrinsic evidence to excuse their duty to
defend where the plaintiff’s complaint or petition alleges facts that suggest the potential for coverage. In 2020, two Texas Supreme Court decisions tested the limits of the eight-corners rule and related limits on
insurers’ use of extrinsic evidence to excuse their duty to defend and
helpfully illuminated this important and contentious issue. More broadly,
and recognizing both the variations in law between jurisdictions and the
typically fact-specific nature of decisions regarding insurers’ duty to defend, it is reasonable to conclude that insurers may rely on extrinsic evidence to excuse their duty to defend in at least two situations beyond
those involving fraud or collusion. First, an insurer should be able to deny
a duty to defend where the extrinsic evidence relates exclusively to the
issue of coverage under the policy. Second, an insurer should be allowed
to use extrinsic evidence to excuse its duty to defend, even if the evidence
arguably relates to the merits of the allegations against the insured, where
the evidence is incontrovertible.
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